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PROSECUTING IN THE SHADOW OF THE JURY
Anna Offit
ABSTRACT—This Article offers an unprecedented empirical window into
prosecutorial discretion, drawing on research between 2013 and 2017. The
central finding is that jurors play a vital role in federal prosecutors’ decisionmaking, professional identities, and formulations of justice. This is because
even the remote possibility of lay scrutiny creates an opening for prosecutors
to make commonsense assessments of (1) the evidence in their cases, (2) the
character of witnesses, defendants, and victims, and (3) their own moral and
professional character as public servants. By facilitating explicit
consideration of the fairness of their cases from a public vantage point, I
argue that imagined jurors serve as an ethical resource for prosecutors.
Part I reviews contemporary legal and interdisciplinary research on the
declining number of jury trials and prosecutorial discretion in the United
States. Part II describes the ethnographic research method deployed in this
case study. Part III presents the empirical findings of this study with attention
to how hypothetical jurors inform prosecutors’ evaluations of their cases,
evidence, investigations, and plea agreement discussions. Part IV considers
several explanations for hypothetical jurors’ perceived relevance to
prosecutors’ work beyond their instrumental and strategic value. Part V
concludes that the United States Attorney’s Office that is the subject of this
study models the democratizing potential of lay decision-makers, even in
hypothetical form. This finding offers a powerful rationale for fortifying the
United States jury system and brings a novel perspective to the study of
prosecutorial ethics.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the infrequency of jury trials in the United States, 1 references
to jurors pervade federal prosecutors’ work from the earliest stages of their
case preparation. This includes prosecutors’ discretion to decline cases,
modify investigations, indict defendants, and encourage guilty pleas. These
1 See DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 327–35 (2016) (providing
statistics showing the decline in jury trials from 1962–2013); SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN
JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND
JURIES 25–48 (2016) (describing how the jury’s role has declined in America as compared to its more
powerful role in the eighteenth century); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the
Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1257–59 (2005) (including data that shows the steady decline
in jury trials in both state and federal courts).
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references are pervasive because the mere possibility that a case will proceed
to trial prompts attorneys to construct the pursuit of justice around the
imperative of appealing to the common sense of an imagined public.
This consideration of hypothetical jurors is underappreciated by
scholars. Many commentators assume that the decline in the overall number
of trials necessarily diminishes lay decision-makers’ impact on the legal
system. 2 Without disputing this view, this Article contributes much-needed
nuance by examining the role that jurors play in the organization of
prosecutions in the United States and, more specifically, as an ethical
resource for federal prosecutors. Its point of departure is the decline of the
American jury trial. Although practitioners and legal scholars have
bemoaned this fact and its implications for individual defendants, 3 there
remains dispute about the influence of the right to a jury trial on the operation
of our justice system.
Emerging from this broader project, this Article is the first to document
the presence of jurors in federal prosecutors’ decision-making as they assess
evidence, witnesses, and ongoing investigations with colleagues and
supervisors. Prosecutors use hypothetical jurors as a strategic resource to
anticipate potential trial jurors’ reactions to evidence, arguments, and
theories of the case. Many also rely on hypothetical jurors to present
impersonal critiques of supervisors’ approaches to cases and evidence. In the
process of invoking jurors’ perspectives, a number of prosecutors give
expression to justice considerations that reorient their exercises of discretion.
They also benefit from the democratizing potential of hypothetical jurors,
which broaden the knowledge repertoires deemed relevant to their work and
prompt collaborative decision-making. 4
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Following this Introduction, Part I
offers an overview of the legal scholarship that bears on this study, focusing
on empirical attention to declining criminal jury trial numbers in the United
States and the concurrent rise in plea agreement dispositions. Part II
describes the qualitative research methods deployed in this research. Part III
presents the Article’s central finding that Assistant United States Attorneys

2
See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community?: The Potential Effect of
the Vanishing Trial on America’s Social Capital, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 165, 176–77 (linking the rarity of
jury trials to the perception that the judicial branch of government is elitist and remote from citizen
participation).
3
See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, So What?: Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenomenon,
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973, 974–76 (2004) (speculating about changes in the legal landscape, such
as the privatization of dispute resolution or a move toward an inquisitorial system, in the event that
American trials were to disappear).
4
See infra Part IV.
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(AUSAs) 5 assess, adjust, and prepare their cases with continual reference to
hypothetical jurors’ perspectives. This data is analyzed in Part IV with
attention to factors that contribute to jurors’ salience in prosecutors’ work.
Finally, Part V provides recommendations for integrating hypothetical jurors
and potential areas for further study.
I.

REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

This inquiry into how federal prosecutors reference hypothetical jurors
builds on prior empirical and theoretical scholarship exploring the evolution
of the jury trial and the role of the prosecutor. To appreciate the implications
of the present study and how it adds nuance to ongoing scholarly discussions,
it is helpful to consider recent developments in the prevalence of jury trials
and prosecutorial discretion.
A. Contributing Factors and Effects of Declining Jury Trial Numbers
Legal and interdisciplinary scholars have documented a steady decline
in federal criminal and civil jury trials over the last century. 6 In 2010, 97.4%
of federal criminal cases were resolved by guilty pleas rather than bench or
jury trials. 7 In 2017, 2.15% of federal criminal defendants that went to trial
had their cases decided by juries.8 Facing a similar, but more precipitous
decline, 0.76% of federal civil cases were resolved by jury trials in 2015, 9

5
I use the “AUSA” acronym and titles “federal prosecutor” and “prosecutor” interchangeably, in
conformity with colloquial usage.
6
See, e.g., ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 82–88 (2009); Marc Galanter,
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460–65 (2004) (focusing on civil litigation).
7
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS ONLINE, at tbl.5.22.2010 (2010), https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JJ9B-7D5S] (showing that the remaining cases that resulted in conviction were resolved
by jury trial (2.3%) or bench trial (0.29%)).
8
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2017,
at tbl.D-4 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_d4_0331.2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/84AM-LP77] (showing that, out of 75,344 total reported federal criminal cases that reached
trial in 2017 (resulting in a conviction or an acquittal), 1618 were tried by juries).
9
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2015, at tbl.4.10 (2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/table4.10_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP2U-MJAH] (showing
that, out of 274,362 total reported federal civil cases that were terminated in fiscal year 2015 (with the
exception of land condemnation cases), 2091 were tried by juries).
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falling to 0.65% in 2017, 10 and 0.60% in 2018. 11 The jury trial rate for civil
cases has remained below 1% since 2005. 12 Mirroring this trend, the number
of citizens summoned to serve as federal jurors between 2006 and 2016
declined by 37%. 13
State criminal and civil jury trials have followed a similar trajectory.
Based on a 2009 stratified sample of forty of the largest seventy-five counties
in the country, data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) shows
that 2% of felony convictions result from trials, 14 with the rest obtained
through guilty pleas. 15 Corroborating this finding, a survey of state criminal
and civil dispositions in fifteen and sixteen jurisdictions, respectively,
reported that 1.1% of criminal cases and 0.5% of civil cases were resolved
by jury trials in 2009. 16
In light of the downward trend these statistics reveal, researchers have
sought explanations for the decline in jury trials. In so doing, they have
paired empirical studies with claims about the implications of diminished lay
participation in the legal system in both the civil and criminal contexts. In
the Sections that follow, I will examine each facet of the legal system in turn.

10
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2017, at tbl.C-4
(2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_c4_0331.2017.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/ZM9F-Q7QF] (showing that, out of the 286,738 total reported federal civil cases that were
terminated during the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2017 (with the exception of land
condemnation cases), 1878 were tried by juries).
11
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-4—U.S. DISTRICT COURT—CIVIL FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (MARCH 31, 2018), at tbl.C-4 (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics/table/c-4/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2018/03/31
[https://perma.cc/F496-UK4C]
(showing that, out of the 286,585 total reported federal civil cases that were terminated during the twelvemonth period ending March 31, 2018 (with the exception of land condemnation cases), 1706 were tried
by juries).
12
MARC GALANTER & ANGELA FROZENA, POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INST., THE CONTINUING DECLINE
OF
CIVIL TRIALS IN AMERICAN COURTS 3–4 (2011), http://www.poundinstitute.org/
sites/default/files/docs/2011%20judges%20forum/2011%20Forum%20Galanter-Frozena%20Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E26Z-CY7R].
13
John Gramlich, Jury Duty Is Rare, but Most Americans See It as Part of Good Citizenship, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rarebut-most-americans-see-it-as-part-of-good-citizenship [https://perma.cc/Y3US-ZUJ7] (noting that in
2006, 307,204 citizens were summoned for jury service—a figure that declined to 194,211 citizens
summoned in 2016).
14
BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES, at tbl.21 (Dec. 2013),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/96VU-Q2XJ].
15
See id.
16
VICTOR E. FLANGO & THOMAS M. CLARKE, REIMAGINING COURTS: A DESIGN FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 68 tbl.4A1, 69 tbl.4A2 (2015) (capturing the declining percentage of case dispositions
by bench and jury trial between 1976 and 2009).
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1. The Decline of the Jury Trial in Civil Litigation
Scholars have attributed the trend away from civil jury trials to the
expansion of pretrial procedure, growing and changing caseloads, pleading
reform, and the proliferation of private alternatives to public dispute
resolution. 17 In response to claims that pleading requirements fail to satisfy
their notice-and-disclosure function for civil litigants, the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implemented a series of pretrial discovery
techniques that effectively replaced trials. 18 Derived from English nonjury
equity courts, these discovery procedures allow parties to compel the
production of paper (and now, electronic) documents 19 and require another
party, under oath, to answer oral questions 20 and respond to written
questions. 21
The scope of discovery was expanded in 1946 when Rule 26 was
amended to encompass material “reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence” and again in 1970 to include “relevant”
material, defined broadly in the Supreme Court’s decision in Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders. 22 In response to critics of liberal discovery rules and
growing dockets, amendments in the 1970s and 1980s increased judges’
managerial power, allowing the court to limit discovery requests deemed
burdensome or wasteful of parties’ resources. 23 This included a revision of
Rule 16 that made “facilitating settlement” an explicit aim of pretrial
conferences. 24 In practice, the discovery rules thus did more to prepare
parties for settlement than for trial by laying out the strengths and
weaknesses of cases to the parties involved. 25

See, e.g., HALE, supra note 1, at 335–41.
John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 542–
45 (2012). Reference to “discovery” encompasses the methods parties use to obtain evidence from one
another—including requests for the production of documents, answers to interrogatories, etc.—under the
rules of civil procedure.
19
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
20
Id. 30(a)(1).
21
Id. 33(b)(3).
22
Id. 26(b)(1); Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (“The key phrase in this
definition—‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action’—has been construed broadly
to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on,
any issue that is or may be in the case.” (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 503 (1947))).
23
SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SLAMMING THE FEDERAL
COURTHOUSE DOORS? 33 (2013). Those who study “managerial judging” have underscored judges’
unreviewable discretion to resolve cases with an eye toward efficiency rather than the benefits of public
adjudication. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges: The Potential Costs, 45 PUB. ADM. REV. 686,
688–89 (1985).
24
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5).
25
Langbein, supra note 18, at 547–48.
17
18
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Declining trial numbers have also been attributed to the growth in civil
case filings and shifting judicial caseload during the twentieth century. This
has included, for example, the rise of employment discrimination and other
civil rights cases, which are more likely to be resolved by summary judgment
than the tort and contract cases they replaced. 26 Furthermore, the increasing
complexity of and preparation time required by civil litigation often lead
parties to rely on extensive discovery rather than long-postponed trials to
glean facts from the various institutional litigants who may be involved in
cases. 27 In federal court, others have noted that growing criminal caseloads
and the Speedy Trial Act’s call for the prompt resolution of such cases create
additional pressure to dispose of civil matters before trial. 28
The heightened pleading standard after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal may also reduce the number of civil jury and bench
trials. 29 In the wake of these decisions, legal scholars have posited that the
Court’s higher “plausibility standard” for relief will lead to the dismissal of
weak cases that would benefit from discovery and proceed to trial. 30 Some
have demonstrated this claim empirically, focusing on Iqbal’s adverse
effects on particular litigants (i.e., individuals as opposed to government and
corporate actors) 31 and impact on civil rights cases. 32 Though the

HALE, supra note 1, at 336–37.
Langbein, supra note 18, at 571.
28
See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts,
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 48–51 (1996). The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, which was
amended in 1979, provides that a trial must begin within seventy days from the date an indictment or
information is filed, or a defendant against whom a charge is pending appears before an officer of the
court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
29
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that the parallel conduct of
telecommunications companies—which did not compete with one another in particular markets—without
evidence of an agreement, was insufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under the Sherman Antitrust
Act); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (dismissing a complaint for purposeful and unlawful
discrimination on the grounds that it did not demonstrate that the petitioners adopted and implemented a
post-9/11 detention policy for the purpose of discriminating based on race, religion, or national origin).
30
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 870–71 (2010) (writing, with respect to Iqbal, that the Court
dismisses “not only clearly meritless suits, but also suits that might merely be described as weak but that
are not meritless (i.e., suits with too low a probability of trial success). An example is a negligence case
in which the defendant’s conduct is within the range that a jury could properly deem unreasonable . . .”);
Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821,
838 (2010) (“The new procedural regime would exchange our current false positives for an unknown
number of false negatives.”).
31
See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117,
2122 (2015) (noting that between 2006 and 2010 individual plaintiffs were more likely to have their cases
dismissed than governmental and corporate plaintiffs).
32
See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 241 (2011–2012) (noting that
26
27
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Administrative Office of the United States Courts identifies cases that are
terminated before trial, it does not provide additional information that would
indicate how many of these cases settle.33 Further empirical research is thus
required to differentiate cases that are dismissed, resolved by summary
judgment or judgments on default, or resolved through other private
agreements in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal. 34
Finally, scholars have also observed the plethora of evolving dispute
resolution techniques that have replaced trials. 35 This includes bureaucratic
organizations’ internalization of adjudication processes 36 and “alternative
dispute resolution” (ADR)—defined broadly as the use of a third-party
neutral decision-maker outside the courtroom. 37 In some cases, disputants
agree to ADR through contractual agreements including, for example, those
related to motor insurance, employment, construction, and agreements
typical of the healthcare and banking industries. 38 Regardless of the source
of the agreement, ADR removes disputes from the civil trial context and
away from the jury.
Scholars have highlighted the implications of the dramatic fall in the
number of civil jury trials for ordinary litigants’ access to courtrooms for
private disputes and the growing privatization of a historically democratic
facet of the U.S. justice system. 39 Though the civil context presents
“motions to dismiss challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings are much more common since Iqbal, and
far more cases are being dismissed after the release of that decision than before”).
33
See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference
in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 571, 580–81 (2004).
34
See id. at 571.
35
See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445, 473
(Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (challenging neat distinctions between “public” and
“private” approaches to dispute resolution).
36
See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations
on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 942–43 (1999) (describing
four ways that legal rulemaking has been internalized, including through the increased (1) “legalization”
of firms, (2) use of ADR within and between organizations, (3) power of in-house counsel, and (4)
internalization of “legal enforcement” through private security personnel).
37
See Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller & Laura Petersen, Escaping the Courthouse: Private Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Los Angeles, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 277, 278 (1996).
38
See id. Stewart Macaulay has also characterized the use of internal dispute resolution procedures
in corporate contexts as part of a parallel criminal justice system. See Macaulay, supra note 35, at 450–
51. Though corporations may avoid the reputational damage associated with public legal proceedings,
the wrongly (or rightly) accused may also face more relaxed evidentiary restrictions than they would see
in court. See id. Likewise, critics of mandatory arbitration clauses that appear in contracts lament the fact
that many consumers not only unwittingly sign away their right to a day in court but also forfeit their
right to participate in class action suits. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets
the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2000).
39
See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the
Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1553–55 (2016) (arguing that class action bans in standard contracts
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distinctive equity and privatization issues, it shares in common with criminal
trial scholarship critical attention to the decreased presence of lay decisionmakers.
2. The Decline of the Jury Trial in Criminal Prosecution
In the criminal context, the most recent available data from a sampling
of the seventy-five largest counties revealed that in 2009, only 2% of
defendants with felony convictions were tried by juries. 40 In 2014, 41 1730
defendants were convicted by juries, whereas 76,163 pleaded guilty. 42 In
federal court this figure is similar; in 2018, juries rendered verdicts in 1.88%
of cases. 43 The historical emergence and pervasiveness of plea agreements
as a means of dispute resolution has been attributed to shifting sentencing
regimes in the United States, affecting parties’ incentives to secure swift and
certain conviction over unpredictable jury verdicts. 44 Proponents of plea
agreements point to their practical necessity in light of courts’ limited
resources and significant caseloads. 45 For some, plea agreements are

have had the effect of keeping poor litigants off the federal docket); see also Richard C. Reuben,
Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 309
(2004) (noting that mandatory arbitration, for example, undermines the goal of democratic governance to
imbue citizens with decision-making autonomy).
40
REAVES, supra note 14, at 24 tbl.21. For misdemeanor convictions this figure is so low that the
Bureau of Justice Statistics does not report a percentage. Id.
41
This is the most recent year for which the Bureau of Justice Statistics has federal data.
42
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING
STATISTICS (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc [https://perma.cc/Y3PA-3E8Q] [hereinafter 2014 FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASE STATISTICS].
43
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE D-4—U.S. DISTRICT COURT—CRIMINAL FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CASELOAD
STATISTICS
(MARCH
31,
2018),
at
tbl.D-4
(2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-4/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2018/03/31
[https://
perma.cc/6B2U-LQ97] (showing that, out of the 76,432 total reported federal criminal defendants whose
cases were disposed of during a twelve-month period ending March 31, 2018, 1436 were tried by juries).
44
See, e.g., LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH
SUMMARY
2
(2011),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5LK-R2D4] (noting that judicial sentencing constraints and the risk associated with
unpredictable jury verdicts prompts defendants to plead guilty and contributes to prosecutors’ discretion).
45
See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (Chief Justice Burger arguing that “[i]f
every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would
need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities”); George Fisher, Plea
Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1038 (2000) (noting that plea bargaining’s efficiency made it
appealing to prosecutors in the mid-nineteenth century); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 21 (1978) (lamenting Supreme Court opinions of the 1970s that presented plea
bargaining as an expedient alternative to honoring historical values undergirding the American
adversarial legal system, including the central role of lay participation therein); Laurie L. Levenson,
Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri v. Frye & Lafler v. Cooper, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
457, 469–70 (2013) (outlining perceived advantages of plea bargains including their speed and
efficiency).
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believed to offer an expedient and equitable alternative to trials. 46 Others
claim that guilty pleas can disparately punish similarly situated defendants
by pointing to idiosyncrasies between verdicts rendered by jurors and
sentences imposed by judges. 47
To this end, some proponents of plea agreements have analogized them
to the bargaining process that precedes civil settlement negotiations, which
similarly take place in the “shadow” of a potential trial. 48 According to this
logic, plea agreements reflect the prosecutor’s interest in maximizing the
deterrent effects of a punishment while conserving resources, and the
defendant’s interest in minimizing his or her sentence. Taking this
bargaining model as a point of departure, some critics highlight obstacles to
the creation of efficient and voluntary agreements, including the contention
that prosecutors’ superior knowledge about the strength of cases results in
asymmetrical relationships vis-à-vis defendants, which can cause defendants
to imprudently waive their right to a jury trial.49
Interdisciplinary legal scholars are increasingly devoting attention to
prosecutors’ discretion to prosecute (or decline to prosecute) cases, which,
as the empirical portion of the Article shows, is a significant but largely

See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 737 (2009) (outlining a defendant’s choice to enter into a plea bargain and the positives
and negatives associated with that alternative); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004) (describing how plea bargains in criminal cases
are like settlements in civil cases in that they exist outside of the shadow of the norm).
47
See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 46, at 738–39 (arguing that prosecutors’ plea
bargaining practices hinder coordinated responsive action on the part of defendants that would undermine
this technique, given that prosecutors do not have the resources to try all defendants in court); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEG. STUD. 289, 303 (1983) (“Inequality thus
is built into the system at the outset. At subsequent stages, the government may select procedural rules
that permit mistaken decisions and thus treat identical cases differently.”).
48
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2467–68 (2004) (critiquing the prevalence of the “shadows of trials” approach to plea bargaining for
failing to consider numerous “legally irrelevant factors” that can result in skewed or inequitably allocated
punishment).
49
See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083, 1101 (2015)
(arguing that contemporary plea bargaining practice affords the defendant “no substantive right against
overwhelming force” by a prosecutor who can legally exercise charging discretion); Jennifer F.
Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 713 (1988)
(explaining the asymmetry between the bargaining positions of the prosecutor and defendant due to the
prosecutor’s superior knowledge and the “time and investigative resources available” to her); see also
Yue Ma, Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining in the United States, France, Germany, and Italy:
A Comparative Perspective, 12 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 22, 25–26 (2002) (commenting that critics of plea
bargaining have highlighted prosecutors’ “unilateral determination of the level of defendants’ criminal
culpability”—undermining plea bargaining’s theoretically equitable “give-and-take” character); Stuntz,
supra note 46, at 2569 (highlighting the added obstacle to efficient bargaining inherent to the opacity of
the plea bargaining process).
46
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opaque barrier to trial. 50 The pressures of public election for both judges and
prosecutors may also take an unpredictable toll on attitudes toward jury
trials; in the criminal context, guilty pleas may promise insulation from
public scrutiny of politically controversial disputes. 51 Literature on criminal
and civil case terminations in advance of trial thus emphasizes the benefits
of public dispute resolution for litigants and lay decision-makers alike. 52
In both the civil and criminal context, jury trials are rare and statistically
in decline. But to understand the function juries continue to play in the
organization of prosecutions, it is important to consider another contributing
factor: prosecutorial discretion.
B. Dimensions and Effects of Prosecutorial Discretion
Federal prosecutors exercise broad discretion in their work. 53 Their jobs
entail negotiating the meaning and limits of federal laws that range from
prohibitions on organized crime, gang violence, and terrorism to the
prosecution of politicians who accept bribes. They can contribute to
decisions on how to investigate cases, 54 what charges to bring, 55 and how to
50

See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW

TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 134–36 (2017) (noting the dearth of empirical data on prosecutorial decision-

making: “Despite the power of prosecutors, there is almost no data or research on what drives them”);
Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits
of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390 (2008) (characterizing the prosecutor’s discretion not to
prosecute as contributing to the “lawless potential of prosecutorial discretion,” which confers a “sovereign
prerogative” on such an official).
51
See John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 261, 270 (1979) (“Not only was the nontrial solution of plea bargaining more rapid than bench trial,
it also protected the weak, elective American trial bench from the moral responsibility for adjudication
and from the political liability of unpopular decisions.”); Bruce P. Smith, Plea Bargaining and the Eclipse
of the Jury, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 131, 135 (2005) (noting a theory of plea bargaining’s increasing
prevalence that links the practice to public elections for prosecutors in the mid-nineteenth century).
52
See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 39, at 1537 (explaining how the unavailability of class action litigation
is disproportionately more harmful to low-income groups); see also HALE, supra note 1, at 405–07
(outlining the value of jury service for participating jurors as well as the criminal justice system more
broadly).
53
See Candace McCoy, Prosecution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
663, 673 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (describing prosecutors’ wide charging discretion as well as offices’
(and individuals’) highly variable criteria for declining to prosecute cases depending on local legal
culture); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 228–29
(1969) (“The American assumption that prosecutors’ discretion should not be judicially reviewable
developed when executive functions were generally unreviewable. The assumption is in need of
reexamination in the light of the twentieth-century discovery that courts can review executive action to
protect against abuses while at the same time avoiding judicial assumption of the executive power.”).
54
See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(asserting prosecutors’ discretion to make investigative decisions).
55
See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (noting that the decision of “what charge
to file or bring before a grand jury” is one that typically rests “in the prosecutor’s discretion”). Prosecutors
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approach plea negotiations. 56 Importantly, in the criminal context, they
decide when to dismiss complaints and indictments 57 or request downward
departures from the Sentencing Guidelines in exchange for defendants’
assistance. 58
In practice, the factors that contribute to prosecutorial decision-making
are complex, variable, and under-studied. With the exceptions of quantitative
research related to filing decisions and trial dispositions 59 and of insights of
prosecutors who choose to publicize their firsthand experience, 60 limited
data exists. Emergent social science and journalistic research suggests that
organizational constraints can limit individual lawyers’ autonomy to make
decisions in particular office environments. 61 This includes the hierarchical
positioning of supervisors within units and divisions with the capacity to
approve and reallocate work responsibilities. 62 These types of organizational
differences, of course, vary between offices and districts.
Legal scholars have also observed a relationship between sentencing
regime changes and prosecutors’ exercise of discretion during plea
agreement discussions. 63 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 aimed to
reduce disparate sentences among similarly situated defendants by requiring
also have discretion to bring charges in federal (rather than state) court, where a conviction may result in
a longer sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The fact that a
greater sentence will result from a federal conviction than from a state conviction alone does not provide
a basis to challenge an indictment.”).
56
See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 840–
41.
57
United States v. Valle, 697 F.2d 152, 154 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The fundamental principle of separation
of powers requires that the executive branch alone, not the judiciary, wield the authority to dismiss
prosecutions for reasons other than legal insufficiency or an abuse of the prosecutorial function.”)
58
Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 233, 236 n.687 (2012).
59
See John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239,
1250 (2012) (analyzing data collected by the National Center for State Courts, which has records on
criminal court felony filing numbers for thirty-four states between 1994 and 2008, and noting the dearth
of available data on prosecutorial decision-making).
60
See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1995) (noting that the basis of the author’s transformed academic
opinion of federal prosecutors stemmed from his previous employment as an AUSA).
61
See Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences on
Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269, 279–
89 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Casualties of Justice, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 3, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/03/casualties-of-justice
[https://perma.cc/P4GG-54M5] (discussing Nicholas Marsh’s participation in the prosecution of Senator
Ted Stevens and noting the behind-the-scenes front office decisions that shifted prosecutors’ roles in the
trial).
62
See Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 61, at 282–84; see also Toobin, supra note 61.
63
See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA 210, 212 (2003) (“[I]n any plea negotiation, the prosecutor’s power to promise the defendant a
particular sentence in exchange for his plea would be greater than before . . . .”).
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that judges impose sentences recommended by the United States Sentencing
Commission. 64 Though designed by Congress to reduce judicial discretion
during sentencing, 65 critics have argued that the Sentencing Guidelines and
the mandatory sentencing schemes, in particular, increase prosecutors’
influence on defendants’ charges and plea agreements.66 Though judges have
tended to depart downward from sentence recommendations since the United
States v. Booker 67 decision made guidelines advisory, 68 their discretion to
sentence above the guidelines range can increase prosecutors’ leverage
during plea agreement discussions. 69
Others contend that prosecutorial discretion can be an engine of
reform. 70 After former Attorneys General Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch
implemented a “Smart on Crime” initiative that called on prosecutors to
consider defendants’ individual characteristics when bringing charges, there
was a demonstrable shift in charging decisions. 71 Prosecutors directed
attention to violent offenses and avoided those that triggered mandatory
minimum sentences. 72 This outcome may be viewed as evidence that policy
See Edward M. Kennedy, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 32 FED. B. NEWS & J. 62, 63 (1985).
See William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choices and the Sentencing Guidelines,
5 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 309 (1993) (“Congress’ main purpose in establishing the Sentencing
Commission [was] to . . . avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
criminal records . . . .”).
66
See Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From Trial
Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 132–36 (2018) (highlighting that prosecutors
have increased influence on defendants’ charges and plea agreements as evidenced by the uptick in the
total amount of plea agreements, the emphasis on sentencing hearings, and the more collaborative
interactions between the prosecution and defense counsel that has ensued following the enactment of the
Sentencing Guidelines and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)); Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes,
To Fear Judging No More: Recommendations for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FED. SENT’G
REP. 187, 187 (1998) (arguing that mandatory sentencing schemes “inevitably shift power toward
prosecutors” who know the sentencing rules in advance and can adjust the charging decisions, among
others, accordingly).
67
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
68
Norman C. Bay, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Post-Booker World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 549,
550 (2006).
69
See id. at 574.
70
See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The “Smart on Crime” Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 909
(2012) (contending prosecutors’ responsibility to seek justice extends to improving the criminal justice
system more broadly).
71
See Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 811, 825 (2017) (citing Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
the United States Attorneys & Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division (Aug. 12, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policyponcharging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2W69-3UUU]).
72
See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New Smart on Crime Data Reveals
Federal Prosecutors Are Focused on More Significant Drug Cases and Fewer Mandatory Minimums for
Drug Defendants (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-smart-crime-data-reveals-federal64
65
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initiatives can influence lawyers’ decisions. However, the policies
prosecutors consider when making decisions about indictments to bring or
sentences to recommend are not limited to defendants’ individual
characteristics. 73 Given this room for variation and independent
considerations, writing on prosecutorial discretion is inexorably bound up in
discussions of prosecutorial ethics, often emphasizing the potential for
misconduct and abuse of power. 74
In light of falling public jury trial numbers and renewed concern about
the extent and ends of prosecutorial discretion, it is important to evaluate the
factors that influence prosecutors’ decisions to indict and what sentences to
recommend. The present study addresses such gaps by focusing on
prosecutors’ preparation of criminal and civil cases.
II. METHODS
This Article draws on research in a United States Attorney’s office. It
included semi-structured interviews with 133 AUSAs. 75 I carried out these
interviews incrementally and cross-sectionally over a five-year period,
beginning in May of 2013. 76 The interviews encompassed prosecutors with
varying levels of jury trial experience in both the criminal and civil divisions
of the office, and irrespective of whether a particular AUSA was involved in
a trial at the time.
To protect their privacy, I assigned a randomly generated two-letter
code to each interviewee (e.g., AA, AB, AC . . . ) so as not to identify them,
prosecutors-are-focused-more-significant-drug-cases-and [https://perma.cc/SVC4-HA3G] (noting the
decrease in federal drug cases involving low-level, nonviolent drug offenders).
73
For example, elected and appointed prosecutors, both state and federal, often take a resourceconscious approach to managing their caseloads. Fairfax, supra note 70, at 909.
74
See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
16 (2007) (noting that even well-meaning prosecutors’ routine work can result in unjust charging
decisions and plea agreements, among other examples); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial
Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996) (arguing that prosecutors must stop abusing their
discretion and make more responsible public policy choices in order to limit their use of already scarce
prison resources).
75
Semi-structured interviews, as deployed in this study, were characterized by open-ended interview
questions that were not guided by a strict set of written questions or prompts. I asked all interviewees
who consented to participate in the study to generally comment on the types of cases they worked on, the
extent to which they had tried cases before juries, and the nature of their legal practice before working at
the U.S. Attorney’s Office. All interviewees and the cases they described have been anonymized for the
purpose of conveying their generalized reflections and decision-making processes.
76
This meant that in the course of my doctoral study I attempted to contact and sit down with each
AUSA in the Office’s criminal and civil division to the extent possible. My selection of interviewees was
often informed by the recommendation of past interviewees that I contact particular colleagues by email.
With the exception of former AUSAs who were not employed in the Office during the research period,
most interviewees took place in person and ranged from ten minutes to two hours.
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their cases, or the district in which they work by name or other identifying
characteristic. I also modified easily identifiable features of cases and
redacted specific dates of office activities and interactions. To the extent that
quotations appear in this Article, they have been modified. The purpose of
these references is to highlight and tease out generalizable formulations that
emerged as typical and representative of AUSAs who dealt with similar
cases, experiences, and ethical questions.
With the support of a National Science Foundation (NSF) grant, I
returned to the office between 2015 and 2017 to conduct additional
interviews, which took place at various points during prosecutors’
involvement in cases at different stages of preparation. During this period of
follow-up study, my selection of interviewees was influenced by court
proceedings and interactions I observed during meetings I was invited to
participate in. The generalized reflections that were shared with me in these
contexts are de-identified and anonymized for the purposes of my analysis
here. 77
The study was governed by an Institutional Review Board (IRB)approved protocol titled “An Ethnographic Study of Lay Participation in the
United States Criminal Justice System.” Following the convention of
ethnographic studies, and in accordance with the protocol, oral consent was
obtained from all interviewees with the understanding that I would not
include any information that would make it possible to identify them in any
publication or presentation.
The insights gleaned from this research offer crucial insight into legal
technique and decision-making. It therefore answers the call of legal scholars
who highlight the value of empirical legal research to the study of case
preparation and trial practice. 78 Among its distinctive strengths, qualitative
research can impact judicial decision-making. 79 Anthropological studies of
trial proceedings and legal practice since the mid-twentieth century have

77
To the extent I cite interactions with AUSAs, I intend to synthesize general and representative
types of statements, interests, and concerns they raised. Throughout this study I distinguish interviews
from other contact I had with AUSAs both in and out of the office. References to “discussions” thus
encompasses both one-on-one conversations with prosecutors as well as my participation in conversations
in the context of group meetings.
78
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
119, 135 (2002); Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment,
80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 69 (1981) (“[D]ebate about the right to jury trial in complex [civil] cases is informed
more by intuitions and assumptions than by systematic knowledge.”).
79
See, e.g., Richard Ashby Wilson, Expert Evidence on Trial: Social Researchers in the International
Criminal Courtroom, 43 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 1, 2–3 (2016) (noting the more prevalent citation and greater
influence of qualitative social science research in international criminal court opinions than quantitative
social science expertise).
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included ethnographic research on American capital trials,80 asylum
proceedings, 81 tribal courts, 82 international tribunals, 83 and the particular
social contexts in which litigants articulate grievances. 84 In the context of
this study, in particular, anthropological research methods were essential.
This is because the impact of the right to a jury trial on legal practice is an
empirical question that cannot be answered by caseload statistics or
quantitative research alone, due to its implications for our entire legal
culture. In addition to its practical fact-finding role, the jury has long been
inflected with distinct values, commitments, and perceived incentives for
litigants. 85 This includes the jury system’s status—or at least aspiration—to
be a truly democratic institution that places power in ordinary people’s hands
so long as minimal requirements related to citizenship, age, literacy, and
residency are met. 86
In contextualizing attorneys’ decisions, ethnographic research, like the
trial itself, can bring greater transparency to the work of individual
prosecutors who exercise wide discretion in their work with limited public
oversight. 87 Unlike research on the legal profession that utilizes post hoc
surveys or questionnaires related to hypothetical cases, this focus on the
professional self-understanding of prosecutors turns its attention outward to
social explanations of decision-making rather than toward “invisible,”
internal, or unconscious domains of judgment. 88 It thus offers a window into
the process by which individual prosecutors articulate rationales for their
conduct. In the absence of such an approach, studies of prosecutorial
discretion can misleadingly presume that prosecutors are monolithic law

80
See generally ROBIN CONLEY, CONFRONTING THE DEATH PENALTY: HOW LANGUAGE
INFLUENCES JURORS IN CAPITAL CASES (2016).
81
See Susan Bibler Coutin, The Oppressed, the Suspect, and the Citizen: Subjectivity in Competing
Accounts of Political Violence, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 63, 81–88 (2001).
82
See generally JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF LAW IN HOPI
TRIBAL COURT (2008).
83
See RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, WRITING HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 192–215
(2011).
84
See CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND COMMUNITY IN AN
AMERICAN TOWN 117 (1986); LAWRENCE ROSEN, BARGAINING FOR REALITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SOCIAL RELATIONS IN A MUSLIM COMMUNITY 29 (1984).
85
See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY (1994).
86
Id. at 2.
87
ANN SOUTHWORTH & CATHERINE L. FISK, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY
PRACTICE 356–57 (2014); McCoy, supra note 53, at 682.
88
See, e.g., David Luban, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2010)
(describing a case in which a prosecutor makes the personal decision to throw a case assigned to him by
a supervisor due to his conviction that the case was unjust).
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enforcement agents, rather than individuals who attempt to conscientiously
carry out their duties. 89
A common thread in anthropological studies of the law is their use of
ethnography, which has encompassed court observation, 90 interviews, 91
archival research, 92 and linguistic analysis. 93 Building on the work of legal
anthropologists attentive to lawyers’ everyday work, 94 this Article
demonstrates that focused and localized ethnographic analysis can valuably
contribute to understandings and assessments of meaningful lay participation
in the U.S. legal system.
Researchers who advocate and deploy such an approach emphasize its
dialogic and reciprocal form, as it is unconstrained by the conventional
power dynamics of formal interviews. 95 After speaking with AUSAs as part
of this study, I generated anonymous notes, which I coded based on themes
in the general types of reflections shared with me. For example, when
AUSAs used the phrase “jury appeal,” as discussed in the next Section, I
highlighted and assigned a searchable code (e.g., “jury appeal”) to sections

89
See James Laidlaw, Agency and Responsibility: Perhaps You Can Have Too Much of a Good
Thing, in ORDINARY ETHICS: ANTHROPOLOGY, LANGUAGE, AND ACTION 143, 152 (Michael Lambek ed.,
2010); see also SOUTHWORTH & FISK, supra note 87, at 336.
90
See SUSAN F. HIRSCH, IN THE MOMENT OF GREATEST CALAMITY: TERRORISM, GRIEF, AND A
VICTIM’S QUEST FOR JUSTICE 149–79 (2006) (describing a national security prosecution that the author
participated in as a witness despite having conflicting views about the theories advanced and punishment
sought by the government).
91
See WILSON, supra note 83, at 192–215.
92
See TOBIAS KELLY, THIS SIDE OF SILENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS, TORTURE, AND THE RECOGNITION OF
CRUELTY (2012).
93
See, e.g., GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY: DISCOURSE IN THE
WILLIAM KENNEDY SMITH RAPE TRIAL 5 (2001) (delineating focus of research as an examination of the
way that “linguistic processes of persuasion participate in the ongoing construction and contestation of
legal reality”); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A
LAWYER” 3 (2007) (describing the researcher’s “focus on language as the window to legal
epistemology”).
94
See MATOESIAN, supra note 93, at 106 (“I show how legal discourse actually unfolds in the situated
details of communicative practice. . . . In the process, I hope to illuminate taken-for-granted legal
processes and language use as an interactive phenomenon of power.”); SUSAN URMSTON PHILIPS,
IDEOLOGY IN THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES: HOW JUDGES PRACTICE LAW, POLITICS, AND COURTROOM
CONTROL, at xii (1998) (noting that “the spoken law really has an interpretive life and a culture of its own
and is not just a reflection of the written law” in describing her empirical attention to judges’ real-time
discourse); RICHLAND, supra note 82, at 7 (“[W]e can only reach a proper understanding of notions of
custom and tradition in contemporary tribal jurisprudence by exploring them in the circumstances of their
use, as they both shape and are shaped by the courtroom talk that forms the center of contemporary tribal
law.”).
95
See CHARLES L. BRIGGS, LEARNING HOW TO ASK: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE ROLE
OF THE INTERVIEW IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 7 (1986); RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE & TRUTH: THE
REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 207 (1993).
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of notes for later aggregation and analysis. This allowed me to identify
unprompted patterns in AUSAs’ reflection about their cases.
Case studies of prosecutorial practice and strategy in particular
jurisdictions have been deployed by interdisciplinary legal scholars to great
effect. 96 The U.S. Attorney’s Office that is the focus of this study was located
in a district that contained a mix of rural and urban counties and had a varied
caseload. The general types of criminal cases that were described to me in
the course of conversations about voir dire ranged from those involving
allegations of employment discrimination to capital murder—characteristic
of offices in numerous federal jurisdictions across the country.
The aim of this case study is thus to highlight and consider the
implications of prosecutors’ attention to jurors, which they viewed as a
central feature of their jobs. Future research and analysis of prosecutorial
decision-making may fruitfully explore whether these insights have more
generalized application to state prosecutors’ offices and defense attorneys’
work, among other legal and nonlegal settings.
III. FINDINGS
The study revealed two categories of information that help explain the
role of the lay public in prosecutorial decision-making: first, factors that
prosecutors understood to influence jury appeal and second, the
interventions of hypothetical jurors in prosecutorial techniques.
A. Factors That Influence Jury Appeal
Prosecutors explained that they often grounded concerns about their
cases in jurors’ likely opinions of them. 97 As prosecutors decided whether to
bring charges against a defendant, for example, there was frequent talk of the
“jury appeal” of evidence and witnesses. 98 In some prosecutors’
formulations, assessing jury appeal was likened to asking, “If I were a juror,
96
For case study research on the subjects of plea agreements, for example, see THEODORE N.
FERDINAND, BOSTON’S LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS, 1814–1850, at 36–37 (1992) (describing the study’s
focus on the “professionalization of the bench” in Boston and shifting role of the lower courts in light of
this); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at
9 (2000) (“The weaknesses of the literature on criminal courts convinced me that a city rather than a
larger political jurisdiction was the appropriate unit for study . . . .”); and Mary E. Vogel, The Social
Origins of Plea Bargaining: An Approach to the Empirical Study of Discretionary Leniency?, 35 J.L. &
SOC’Y 201, 209 (2008) (pinpointing the emergence of plea bargaining in Massachusetts in the 1830s and
1840s based on data gathered from Boston’s lower court).
97
See, e.g., Interviews with CO, DH, DN & EQ, AUSAs (2013–2017). As described in the methods
section, each AUSA I spoke to as part of my doctoral research was randomly assigned a two-letter code,
the key of which is confidential as per IRB requirements.
98
See, e.g., Interviews with AH, AI, AN, AU, AZ, BF, BN, BR, BS, CB, CE, CR, CV, CW, CZ, DB,
DE, DH, DK, DO & DU, AUSAs (2013).
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what would I think?” or a practice of weighing whether a “hypothetical
juror” would feel that a case should not be prosecuted even if it legally could
be. 99 As a practical matter, discussion of jury appeal offered a resource for
articulating concerns and ambivalence about cases from a position of
detachment. 100 These concerns sometimes informed prosecutors’ decisions
to dismiss cases. 101
Prosecutors also described cases they felt lacked jury appeal. They
frequently cited allegations of “structuring” as examples of such cases. In
structuring cases, defendants are charged with deliberately limiting the
increments of money involved in bank transactions to avoid triggering a
federal reporting requirement. 102 As stand-alone cases, some prosecutors
worried they would not appeal to hypothetical jurors. 103 One theme in a
number of prosecutors’ reflections on the subject was the difficulty of
explaining to jurors that a law that might sound like a tedious regulatory
requirement had an important rationale. When charging a defendant with
structuring some prosecutors would therefore go out of their way to charge
another underlying crime—like a larger financial scheme or terrorist plot, for
example. 104 When structuring cases were charged on their own, however,
jurors were imagined to be less receptive. Another prosecutor suggested that
jurors might worry that their own failure to fill out paperwork be considered
a violation of the law, making them reluctant to view a similarly situated
defendant as blameworthy. 105 As several commentaries on structuring
suggested, prosecutors did not automatically prosecute violations of federal
law, citing future jurors’ attitudes as grounds for their decisions.
Commonsense sources of skepticism and concern about a case were
thus projected onto external decision-making agents. It was not enough to
demonstrably prove that a federal law had been broken. The future jurors
these (and other) prosecutors imagined might feel that such a crime did not
warrant punishment. Reference to hypothetical jurors thus aided
99
See, e.g., Interviews with BF & BK, AUSAs (2013); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at 7
(reflecting on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with future jurors’ hypothetical interpretations in
mind).
100
Anna Offit, With Jurors in Mind: An Ethnographic Study of Prosecutors’ Narratives, LAW,
CULTURE & HUMANITIES (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5–6) (on file with Northwestern University
Law Review).
101
See, e.g., Interviews with DH & DN, AUSAs (2013). In 2014, federal prosecutors in the U.S.
dismissed 6822 cases—a figure that does not reflect the number of cases that were referred elsewhere or
set aside as investigations were underway. 2014 FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE STATISTICS, supra note 42.
102
See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) (2012) (prohibiting any person from structuring transactions “with one
or more domestic financial institutions” for the purpose of evading reporting requirements).
103
See, e.g., Interviews with AE, BI & BZ, AUSAs (2013).
104
See, e.g., Interview with BZ, AUSA (2013).
105
See, e.g., Interview with BI, AUSA (2013).
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formulations of the de minimis character of cases; even cases that technically
could be prosecuted were not always perceived as justifying expending the
resources of the office. 106
An example of such a case involved the circulation of fake prescription
pads by a retired pharmacist. Here, law enforcement agents intended to put
a tracker on the packages containing the counterfeit prescriptions before they
were confiscated.107 Prosecuting the unlawful receipt of one individual’s
prescription pads without further evidence of illegally obtained drugs or
victims, however, was not something the prosecutor who learned about this
case imagined future jurors would care about. This contrasted with a juryappealing case he did imagine—involving a more coordinated effort to
prosecute a major pharmacy chain for supplying prescription drugs to a drug
trafficking ring. 108
Other factors that contributed to prosecutors’ perceptions of jury appeal
included the intelligibility of the evidence they would present to jurors, the
credibility of potential witnesses, and the sympathy jurors might feel for the
defendants or victims of alleged crimes.
1. Intelligibility of Alleged Crimes and Evidence
Prosecutors often interpreted the questions that grand jurors raised
about their cases as indicative of future trial jurors’ sources of confusion. 109
If grand jurors asked hundreds of questions, a prosecutor explained, she
would take that as a warning that twelve future trial jurors might have
broader concerns. 110 Though federal prosecutors are not constitutionally
106
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993):

The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. The
prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest
decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a
conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising
his or her discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor’s reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense or the
offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; and
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
107
108
109
110
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required to present exculpatory evidence to grand jurors, 111 the office that
was the subject of this study conformed to a stricter internal policy mandated
by the Department of Justice. 112 As a result, grand jurors’ reactions to
unfavorable evidence were seen as offering practical guidance. Prosecutors
explained that grand jurors were often viewed as a guide for what trial jurors
might do. This sometimes led them to ask grand jurors what they thought
about particular pieces of evidence and how their presentation could be made
more persuasive. 113 Grand juror presentations also helped prosecutors gauge
how “relevant” 114 their evidence would seem to jurors at trial. 115 Prosecutors
thus kept track of grand jurors’ questions, making note of what they might
need to address through their later questioning of witnesses. 116
Those who worked on cases involving allegations of bribery were
particularly attuned to the difficulty of explaining why their cases should
matter to jurors. This was true, for example, of a case in which a local police
officer accepted money from people he knew well. Jurors might interpret
these kinds of transactions, some worried, as a hospitable gesture among
individuals who knew each other well. Another prosecutor encouraged
agents to record conversations whenever possible because the challenge of
proving a defendant’s state of mind boiled down to jurors’ competing
interpretations of language. 117
Unlike gun cases or child abuse prosecutions that appeared to have
“clear-cut bad guys,” prosecutors noted that politicians accepted money all
the time. The challenge was to prove they took money in exchange for
carrying out official acts. 118 For this reason, prosecutors focused on making
the significance of public corruption cases apparent to jurors in order to
combat jurors’ potential perceptions of “how business gets done” in politics.
In the context of preparing such cases, prosecutors thus imagined the
impressions and interpretations of future jurors continually. 119
In the context of discussions about voir dire and jury appeal, some felt
they had no choice but to prosecute cases that would be unappealing to the
111
See Ali Lombardo, Note, The Grand Jury and Exculpatory Evidence: Should the Prosecutor Be
Required to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence to the Grand Jury?, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 829, 857–61 (2000)
(arguing that a duty should be imposed on prosecutors in Ohio to disclose exculpatory evidence to grand
jurors).
112
See, e.g., Interview with DT, AUSA (2013).
113
See, e.g., Interview with DS, AUSA (2013).
114
See, e.g., Interview with BF, AUSA (2013).
115
See, e.g., Interview with BT, AUSA (2013).
116
See, e.g., Interviews with DS & DT, AUSA (2013).
117
See, e.g., Interview with AE, AUSA (2013).
118
See, e.g., Interviews with AF & DB, AUSAs (2013).
119
See supra note 118.
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jurors they imagined. This included national security cases in which agents
could not legally divulge the investigative techniques they deployed to lay
decision-makers (and sometimes prosecutors) due to statutory constraints. 120
Some prosecutors considered jurors’ incomplete access to—or lack of
awareness of—classified information and evidence-gathering methods when
deciding whether a case should be prosecuted. 121
One illustrative commentary emphasized the importance of analyzing
cases with reference to the evidence jurors would actually see rather than the
full universe of evidence known to those organizing a prosecution. 122 In
some cases this meant prosecuting suspected terrorists with a lesser offense
like tax evasion while considering how such cases might “look” to a jury. 123
Cases that involved prosecuting drug dealers or gang members were also
cause for concern due to jury considerations. The effect of aggregating
defendants under a racketeering law, for example, led some prosecutors to
worry that jurors would lack sympathy for victims who engaged in violent
criminal activity themselves. 124
Other prosecutors viewed hypothetical jurors’ anticipated indifference
to their cases as a challenge, because their job was to make jurors care. The
onus should be on a prosecutor, the theory went, to explain the consequences
of behavior that might seem innocuous to a lay outsider. 125 Other prosecutors
shared the view that any case could be made to appeal to a juror if it could
be presented as bringing a defendant’s greed to light. 126 To the extent that
particular white-collar crimes were unfamiliar to jurors, the burden of
explaining why they should be taken seriously rested with the prosecutor
who might try them. Hypothetical jurors thus prompted reflection on how to
articulate the societal implications of different allegations of wrongdoing. By
one prosecutor’s account, this exercise involved asking herself, “Why should
I care about this? From someone shoplifting bubble gum to committing
murder—and everything in between.” 127
2. Credibility of Witnesses
Another common theme in prosecutors’ reflections on recurrent jury
concerns related to perceptions of witness credibility and character. This is
because prosecutors often selected or substituted witnesses for one another
120
121
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124
125
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based on jurors’ anticipated impressions of them. To this end, a majority of
the prosecutors I interviewed or assisted with case preparation reflected on
the question of whether jurors would like or dislike particular witnesses,
including those who were otherwise providing evidence that was important
to a case. 128
When there was concern that a witness might come across as abrasive,
rude, or incredible, prosecutors considered how to elicit information on
direct examination that might change these impressions. 129 Even an honest
person might appear to a juror as if he were not telling the truth. 130 Rather
than critique a witness’s testimony on its own terms, prosecutors framed their
guidance in terms that emphasized what a shame it would be if police officer
witnesses, for example, lost future cases because jurors did not believe their
testimony. Time and again, concern about jurors’ potential skepticism
toward law enforcement officers informed prosecutors’ discussions of whom
they should choose to testify. 131
Prosecutors also described their efforts to anticipate jurors’ responses
to cooperating witnesses. In light of such witnesses’ own criminal conduct
and interest in reducing their punishment, AUSAs expected jurors to have
difficulty taking them at their word. 132 This led some to feel reluctant about
taking cases to trial that relied exclusively on the testimony of a cooperator
and view corroboration of such testimony through law enforcement agents’
records, for example, to be essential. 133 To the extent that prosecutors
suspected that jurors would dislike “scumbag” cooperators, some worried
that their testimony might “tank” if jurors were to view their potential for a
reduced sentence to be unjust. 134 Others worried that laypeople might fail to
understand why a cooperating witness could be—or should be—essential to
prosecutions at all.
Such a concern arose in a case that relied on the testimony of a
cooperator who was a foreign national who had failed to register as a sex
offender under federal law. Before committing to put this witness on the
See, e.g., Interviews with AA, AY, BQ & DI, AUSAs (2013).
See, e.g., Interview with BZ, AUSA (2013).
130
See, e.g., Interview with CX, AUSA (2013).
131
See, e.g., Interview with BT, AUSA (2013); Anna Offit, Peer Review: Navigating Uncertainty in
the United States Jury System, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 169, 177 (2016) (describing AUSAs’ awareness
that a number of prospective jurors reported negative encounters with law enforcement agents during voir
dire questioning).
132
See, e.g., Interviews with AK, BI, CG, DO & DP, AUSAs (2013).
133
See, e.g., Interview with CG, AUSA (2013). References to “records” in this context could refer to
phone records, for example, or other official documents prepared in the routine course of law enforcement
agents’ work.
134
See, e.g., Interview with AE, AUSA (2013).
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stand, prosecutors expressed concern about how evidence of this witness’s
past wrongdoing might “play” to future jurors. 135 In this context, prosecutors
assigned to the case were relieved to discover a family conflict at the heart
of the defendant’s wrongdoing; while residing outside the United States, he
had impregnated a younger teenage cousin. Though his underlying sex crime
did not cast the cooperator in a flattering light, the context of his prior
conviction amidst familial strife was imagined to be more palatable to future
jurors.
Although this case, like most in the office, did not proceed to trial,
jurors’ imagined misgivings about the cooperating witness informed
prosecutors’ case preparation. One prosecutor, for example, indicated that
knowledge of witnesses’ strengths and weaknesses was an essential part of
considering the type of impact evidentiary presentations might have on
jurors. 136 This case contrasted with others in which prosecutors felt that
cooperating witnesses could not take the stand under any circumstance due,
for example, to the incendiary and indefensible nature of emails that might
come to light during trial, calling their character into question.137
Despite believing that cooperating witnesses would testify truthfully as
a condition of the leniency prosecutors could ask of a sentencing judge,
prosecutors worried that jurors would view cooperators less generously. As
laypeople understand them, cooperators might appear to be murderers
testifying to get less jail time—or people who convinced others to commit
crimes to help the government build a bigger case. 138 Though prosecutors
conceded their own inclination to believe witnesses whom they met and
spoke with dozens of times, they acknowledged the difficulty that knowledge
of numerous lies might pose for jurors who would not be satisfied by the
corroboration, for example, of other drug dealers. 139 One prosecutor
approached this concern by attempting to put herself in the position of a juror
hearing such a witness for the first time without the benefit of protracted
pretrial contact. This imaginative exercise helped her prepare cases,
recognizing that jurors would understandably be skeptical, particularly in
light of judges’ explicit instructions that cooperating witnesses’ desire for
leniency could present a conflict of interest and should be weighed carefully
in evaluating their credibility. 140
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Stories of acquittals in cases with highly unappealing cooperators were
shared, anecdotally, as warnings of the perils of disregarding jurors’ possible
perceptions of witnesses before indicting defendants. 141 One prosecutor’s
recollection of a particularly offensive cooperating witness revealed an
overriding concern with the “optics” of cases to lay onlookers. Part of the
evidence in an illustrative case involved a cooperator who used racist
language in a text message, which, a prosecutor thought, inherently
undermined the case. Any attempt at justifying or minimizing such language,
he explained, would be a “sideshow” if the case proceeded to trial and,
further, made his support for this witness’s credibility personally
uncomfortable and indefensible. 142 As a general matter, attention to jurors’
perceptions of testimony as offensive prompted some AUSAs to ask
cooperators to think about the language they used during investigations. One
prosecutor, for example, explicitly told a witness not to curse because—
although this was not improper or illegal—it might not look good to future
jurors. 143
Prosecutors also evaluated case agents’ character and credibility with
jurors in mind. As an agent sat across the table from him, one prosecutor
noted that he routinely considered how grand jurors and potential trial jurors
might react to particular witnesses. 144 Though this AUSA recognized the
abstractness of this calculation, because he could not possibly anticipate a
jury’s ultimate makeup, he viewed this assessment comparable to
assimilating the impression of a “random person off the street” into his own
evaluation. 145
Arising from this same concern about jurors’ poor opinions of
witnesses, prosecutors sometimes perceived other law enforcement agents’
approaches to cases as insufficiently oriented toward trials, despite the
necessity of interagency collaboration. Recognizing agencies’ different
criteria for professional advancement, some prosecutors noted that
quantitative indices of successful investigations—like arrests—could trump
other considerations. 146 Amplifying this view, another prosecutor explained
that he would not recommend arresting a target unless he was certain he
could win at trial. 147
See, e.g., Interview with AZ, AUSA (2013).
See, e.g., Interview with BG, AUSA (2013).
143
See, e.g., Interview with CF, AUSA (2013).
144
See, e.g., Interview with AP, AUSA (2013).
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Some prosecutors thus viewed part of their job as convincing agents
who were otherwise focused on making arrests to anticipate trials. In some
cases, prosecutors worried that the professional recognition conferred on
agents for making probable cause-based arrests encouraged them to keep
investigations moving—and that in their zeal to make such arrests agents
might pay less attention to other evidentiary issues they would face at trial.148
Likewise, some agents who perceived prosecutors to move cases quickly
expressed appreciation, viewing speed as a sign of competence and
efficiency. 149 One AUSA indicated that she perceived it to be her job to
consider how evidence would “hold up” to jurors’ scrutiny at trial. 150
In another illustrative account, a prosecutor recalled a meeting in which
prosecutors’ and case agents’ supervisors met to discuss (and resolve)
divergent opinions about a case involving the sale of fraudulent lottery
tickets. This prosecutor’s supervisor planned to assess the case’s strength and
get everyone on the “same page.” 151 Though the prosecutor thought the
evidence in his case was strong, he noted its complexity. By contrast, from
the supervising AUSA’s and agent’s perspectives, the case was a “slam
dunk.” 152
Talk of fictive jurors thus made character assessment a central feature
of prosecutors’ case preparation. In addition to encompassing the assessment
of potential witnesses’ character traits, prosecutors readily scrutinized the
evidentiary orientations of colleagues who carried out investigations and
made arrests. Points of personal disagreement and competing interpretations
of the same evidence were thus attributed to detached and hypothetical lay
critics.
3. Sympathy for Defendants and Victims
Another common theme in prosecutors’ reflections on jury selection
and trial preparation was concern that defendants might elicit sympathy. 153
To this end, a prosecutor recalled a case in which a defendant sounded
sympathetic during the same video recordings that would be played to jurors
as evidence of her wrongdoing. While accepting under-the-table payments,
for example, this defendant asked her accomplices intimate and empathetic
questions about members of their families. Upon seeing these warm
exchanges, the prosecutor assigned to the case imagined that future jurors
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would be drawn to her. 154 Likewise, laypeople were imagined to be forgiving
of those who broke laws to keep electricity running in their businesses,
employed people during a recession, or looked like scapegoats for more
culpable individuals who were not indicted. 155 A defendant who fraudulently
gave tax refunds to a poor family, for example, might look more like “Robin
Hood” than a criminal. 156
Prosecutors’ descriptions of two criminal cases illustrated the role of
hypothetical jurors in shaping their own perceptions of defendants. In the
first of these cases, a defendant was charged with failing to report the death
of his mother and continuing to accept civil service retirement benefits on
her behalf. The defendant worked as a government mail clerk and used the
money to support himself and his unemployed niece. Despite this additional
income, the prosecutor assigned to the case recalled that the defendant was
elderly and lived in poverty. 157 In light of these financially precarious
circumstances, the prosecutor took into account whether charging the
defendant before his planned retirement might preclude him from receiving
pension benefits in the event he was convicted of a felony. Furthermore,
though some jurors might perceive the defendant to be receiving a great deal
of money, the prosecutor said he recognized that it was “very little monthto-month.” 158 The country’s difficult economic climate, he worried, would
make for an unsympathetic jury. Hypothetical jurors’ potentially unjust
characterization of the evidence, as he understood it, thus guided his sense
of what a just result would entail for the defendant. 159
In a second case, a prosecutor imagined that jurors’ views might mirror
those of colleagues she consulted as proxies. A defendant’s distraction on a
family camping trip in a national park led to the drowning of an unsupervised
child. The U.S. Attorney at the time assigned the case to a prosecutor who
recognized its sensitivity. Taking seriously her discretion to prosecute it, the
AUSA immediately set to work informally surveying colleagues on the
likely reactions of future jurors—a practice referred to by others as “jury
testing.” 160
This prosecutor’s first impulse was to speak with members of the
defendant’s family for a window into the way others assessed her character.
Was she generally viewed as absentminded? Irresponsible? The consensus
154
155
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seemed to be that she was a conscientious mother—and heartbroken by the
incident. 161 Based on this discovery, the AUSA worried about the polarizing
nature of the case for future jurors. Though some sympathized with the
defendant, who had surely suffered, others felt the prosecutor had an
obligation to demand justice on behalf of a victim who could not speak for
himself and whose death could easily have been prevented.162
Drawing on her peers’ divided opinions, she imagined jurors engaged
in a similarly intractable debate during their deliberations. Though she
personally felt the case was worthy of prosecution, it seemed clear that
twelve people were unlikely to agree on the defendant’s guilt. 163 When the
case was ultimately resolved with a guilty plea, the prosecutor was
relieved—though she disagreed with the judge about the defendant’s
ultimate punishment. Although both of these cases—like most in the
office—were resolved by guilty plea rather than jury trial, the prosecutors
assigned to them eagerly assessed the defendants and victims in their cases
with continual reference to jurors. 164
In describing other examples of the role of hypothetical jurors,
prosecutors worried that defendants might appear to be more sympathetic in
cases with unsympathetic victims. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) came
up as a frequent example cited by several prosecutors who referred to
unrelated cases. One prosecutor explained the challenge of combatting an
attitude that he worried jurors would share. Recognizing, with humor, the
likelihood of negative juror attitudes toward the IRS, he “bent over
backwards” to appear fair. 165 Another colleague who tried tax cases lamented
the fact that jurors often failed to distinguish between the IRS and his own
employer, the Department of Justice. Regardless of the truth of their beliefs,
he said, he worried jurors would dislike the agency they thought he worked
for. 166
In addition to thinking about whether a defendant might elicit
sympathy, prosecutors also considered other emotional responses defendants
might elicit. In light of jurors’ anticipated moral outrage, prosecutors
sometimes expressed ambivalence about prosecuting cases that involved
allegations of child pornography. 167 In one case, a prosecutor recalled a story
in which a prospective juror reportedly responded to a judge with violent
161
162
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outrage upon hearing the allegations in such a case. 168 Another prosecutor
described a case in which a target found with child pornography worked as
a youth baseball coach. Though the case differed from those typically tried
in federal court, consideration of jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s
conduct and victims’ vulnerability informed the decision to prosecute him. 169
In a white-collar case, a prosecutor took comfort in the fact that jurors
would likely find the defendant in her case distasteful. She explained that she
had been told that the defendant was a “dick.” He was tall, looked imposing,
and wore expensive suits. It would be great for her case, she thought, if he
brought the lack of contrition that characterized his everyday demeanor into
the courtroom with him. 170 This, after all, might bolster the government’s
arguments about his greed. She compared the case to another she tried in
which the defendant was an elderly woman who would flaunt her wealth
outside of court while hobbling into court with a walker during trial. 171 The
trial team shared similar concerns about a defendant’s appearance in advance
of jury selection in a public corruption case. Here, they described the
defendant as someone who looked as though he had stepped out of a fashion
magazine. He presented himself like a person with modest beginnings,
having “pulled himself up from his bootstraps.” 172
As these examples suggest, hypothetical jurors gave prosecutors a
framework for scrutinizing the jury appeal of their cases. This analysis could
then serve as a metric for measuring the intelligibility of charges, a basis for
contesting the credibility of witnesses, and a standard for considering which
defendants were worthy of prosecution. As a morally malleable construct,
hypothetical jurors also aided prosecutors’ management of ongoing
investigations, evaluations of the sufficiency of available evidence, and
approaches to plea agreement discussions.
B. Interventions of Hypothetical Jurors in Prosecutorial Technique
By prosecutors’ accounts, criminal cases fell into two broad categories:
“reactive” and “proactive.” In “reactive” cases, an alleged crime had taken
place (e.g., a person was stopped at an international airport with a fake
passport) and was phoned in to an on-duty prosecutor. The prosecutor who
received this call was tasked with evaluating it and recommending a course
of action to his or her supervisor. A relevant consideration when assessing
these potential cases was a future jury’s likely reaction to them and the
168
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evidence involved. Because the prosecutors “on duty” to evaluate such cases
would be assigned to them from intake through trial, they emphasized the
importance of considering the cases’ shortcomings with reference to lay
decision-makers. 173
“Proactive” cases, in contrast, reached prosecutors (either directly or
through their supervisors) as investigations were ongoing. These cases
required collaboration with law enforcement agents who made arrests,
searched targets’ homes, interviewed potential witnesses, and continued to
gather evidence. Over the course of these working relationships, prosecutors
sometimes advised agents about the weight, necessity, and admissibility of
evidence, as well as their own ability to prove each element of the crimes
they would charge. In conjunction with case agents, prosecutors made
decisions about investigative techniques with hypothetical jurors’
perspectives in mind—including at the earliest phases of an investigation—
and assessed whether adequate evidence had been gathered. Prosecutors
were also alert to whether they could explain the significance of their
evidence to jurors, which informed their discussions of potential plea
deals. 174
1. Investigating Criminal Cases
Most prosecutors indicated in semi-structured interviews that they
regularly considered jurors’ impressions of evidence as investigations were
underway. 175 This prompted greater reflexivity as prosecutors evaluated the
investigations-in-progress that agents presented to them. 176 To this end, a
prosecutor reflected that jurors served as a check on his personal decisionmaking process that prompted him to ensure he had enough “at every stage”
with an eye toward what evidence would be presented to jurors at trial. 177
According to this AUSA, case preparation was tethered to a future
hypothetical trial in which jurors were the arbiters of even the most
preliminary assessments of evidence. Prosecutors then used this framework
to figure out organizational strategies for their investigations—ranging from
the selection and preparation of witnesses to decisions about particular
investigative techniques to employ or avoid. 178
This focus extended to prosecutors’ discretionary decisions related to
witnesses a prosecutor would try to “flip”—or have cooperate against the
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target of a prosecution—as well as to considerations of which individuals
might testify on the government’s behalf. As a general rule, informed by the
intuitions they imputed to lay decision-makers, prosecutors were reluctant to
ask individuals with large roles in criminal schemes to testify against those
in lower level roles. 179 In a fraud case, for example, a prosecutor lamented
the fact that a low-level employee had been charged. 180 Amplifying this
sentiment, other colleagues worried that future jurors would be as leery of
company leaders turning on subordinates as they would be of family
members testifying against one another. 181
Consideration of future jurors also extended to prosecutors’ views on
how the targets of their investigations should be monitored and arrested. One
prosecutor described his horror upon learning that a law enforcement agent
had been following a lawyer in an airplane. Among the reasons he put an end
to the investigation, he cited jurors’ likely intuition that this approach to
monitoring a target was out of sync with reasonable law enforcement
practices. He concluded that a future juror, like him, would wonder whether
an agent deploying this technique under the circumstances was out of his
mind. 182
Other prosecutors’ ideas about how targets should be apprehended
reflected their understanding of ethical norms they believed future jurors
would share. As an example, a prosecutor described a white-collar case that
involved a business owner who was suspected of being involved in a
fraudulent scheme. After learning that another law enforcement agent
planned to arrest this individual at work, he proposed an alternative that he
believed would be more palatable to future jurors. His impulse was to
imagine a jury, months down the road, hearing a defendant argue that he was
innocent—did nothing wrong—yet had arresting agents destroy his career
and humiliate him in front of his coworkers. At the end of the day, this
prosecutor recognized that it would be left to him to defend aggressive tactics
in front of jurors, which strengthened his sense of the importance of orienting
one’s work around jurors from the inception of the case through its
conclusion. 183
Ideas about jurors’ potential interpretations also intervened as
prosecutors considered whether particular investigative approaches might
violate lay citizens’ ideas about fair evidence-gathering practices. Here,
again, jury concerns effectively amended the enforcement of federal laws,
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and particularly in the context of drug crimes. Two undercover narcotics
investigation practices that were subject to scrutiny due to jury-related
concerns included offering to sell drugs to suspected drug dealers and
offering resources to rob other drug dealers. In the first type of case,
prosecutors worried that agents’ deployment of a tactic known as a
“reverse” 184— in which undercover agents posed as drug dealers and arrested
drug-purchasing targets—would be perceived by jurors as unfair. 185 When
law enforcement agents offered to put drugs in people’s hands as a way of
combatting their circulation, prosecutors thought jurors would be skeptical.
Although no drugs actually changed hands during these investigations,
prosecutors were more confident that jurors would see the criminality of
targets’ conduct as outweighing the distasteful circumstances of such arrests
when agents offered to sell drugs for large sums of money. 186
Another investigative technique that prosecutors scrutinized with
reference to jurors was designed to target violent criminals. Referred to in
some jurisdictions as a “home invasion reversal,” such investigations often
began with an undercover agent alerting targets to an opportunity to rob a
local drug dealer’s stash, which in reality was a location controlled by the
agent. The agents would set a time and place for the theft. Recognizing that
hypothetical jurors might perceive this technique as deceptive or inducing
otherwise law-abiding people to commit crimes, 187 the prosecutors who
weighed in on these investigations asked the agents they worked with to give
targets several opportunities to change their minds and walk away, on video,
before arresting them. In some cases, investigations were abandoned
altogether. When a target whom agents approached to carry out a robbery
arrived on a bicycle and appeared harmless to an AUSA, for example, this
prosecutor recommended the investigation be called off, imagining future
jurors’ potential concerns about entrapment or government overreaching.
When targets arrived with bulletproof vests, weapons of their own, and
plastic wrist ties to immobilize victims, however, future jurors were believed

184
Or “reverse sting” operation. See Adam Longo, Police “Reverse Sting” Operations Under
Scrutiny by AZ Supreme Court, CBS 5 PHOENIX (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.azfamily.com/news/policereverse-sting-operations-under-scrutiny-by-az-supreme-court/article_a52049a6-7f37-54f6-a3d0fe7bb50d56f9.html [https://perma.cc/V8TK-MF2Q].
185
See, e.g., Interview with AH, AUSA (2013).
186
Id. (noting that law-abiding citizens were less likely to walk around with $500,000 in cash than
drug dealers).
187
Prosecutors I spoke with about this tactic cited a USA Today article that described “home
invasion” prosecution techniques in detail as evidence that future jurors—and laypeople generally—had
likely formed impressions about them. See Brad Heath, ATF Uses Fake Drugs, Big Bucks to Snare
Suspects, USA TODAY (June 28, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/27/atfstash-houses-sting-usa-today-investigation/2457109 [https://perma.cc/V9J9-U8S5].
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to perceive the defendants as dangerous and violent and therefore approve of
the tactics used to arrest them. 188
By prosecutors’ accounts, the gaze of imagined jurors thus created a
professionally acceptable opening for prosecutors to articulate extralegal and
subjective concerns about ongoing and planned investigations.
2. Approaching Plea Agreement Discussions
Prosecutors’ assessments of the strength of their evidence, perceived
seriousness of the cases charged, and unsympathetic character of defendants
often entered plea agreement discussions explicitly. A federal prosecutor
who tried drug and violent crime cases that involved wiretap evidence, for
example, routinely explained to defendants that in his eleven years of
experience he had never seen a jury acquit a defendant in federal court. He
indicated that in these cases deliberations would not be long because wiretap
and video evidence would make it easy for jurors to understand. 189 Appealing
to the accessibility and clarity of the evidence to future jurors, he then invited
defendants to elicit their attorneys’ perspectives on how jurors would likely
view the case.
Another prosecutor who tried gang cases made similar appeals during
plea agreement discussions. To the extent that jurors would see evidence that
the defendant committed violent crimes near an elementary school, a
prosecutor recalled conveying to a defendant that jurors’ disdain for the
defendant would be immediate. 190 Unlike some of his colleagues, who
imagined particular types of people who might be empaneled as jurors, this
prosecutor imagined his future jurors as a generalized “collective.” He
pictured an “abstract model jury in [his] head” all intently listening to
everything he had to say. To the extent that he viewed evidence in his cases
as strong, he imagined that jurors would do the same. 191
In a tax fraud case, another prosecutor encouraged a defendant to
consider how a jury would view her conduct if the case went to trial. A large
part of his interactions with the defendant thus involved imagining jurors’
likely perspectives. 192 In this AUSA’s view, a future jury would have “no
patience” for a person who sought to enhance her material well-being by
stealing federal tax dollars. The defendant’s ultimate decision to accept a
plea offer, in his view, was prompted by the adoption of his narrative about
fictive lay decision-makers.
188
189
190
191
192

See, e.g., Interview with CV, AUSA (2013).
See, e.g., Interview with AD, AUSA (2017).
See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2013).
See, e.g., Interview with AD, AUSA (2013).
See, e.g., Interview with AF, AUSA (2013).
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When prosecutors felt that cases or charges lacked jury appeal, pursuing
plea agreements was a potential source of anxiety. 193 To this end, prosecutors
contended that it was best to negotiate plea deals from the position of being
prepared to try a case. 194 As one AUSA put it, cases with “zero jury appeal”
could lead judges to take a hostile attitude toward cases, let alone jurors. 195
Another prosecutor said that he felt he “knew” when he would not have the
jury on his side and that proceeding to trial would be risky. 196
As a matter of office practice, the plea deals that prosecutors proposed
to defendants during initial proffer or “show and tell” meetings did not
improve from those they would offer as trials approached. When prosecutors
learned information about defendants that they believed would make them
seem more sympathetic—or less culpable—to jurors, this approach could
shift. 197 During an interview, one prosecutor indicated that these decisions
regarding the judgment of hypothetical jurors were “defendant-specific.” 198
And individual prosecutors could have different impressions of the relevance
of these subjective assessments to plea discussions. 199
In other cases, prosecutors’ approaches to plea agreement discussions
focused on locally and regionally specific attitudes of their anticipated lay
decision-makers. A notable example of this was a case that involved an
alleged assault of a child. The lead prosecutor assigned to the case took
seriously the fact that prospective jurors in his region of the country would
be likely to view a teacher’s use of physical discipline as problematic. Had
the case been tried in another part of the country, he explained, their venire
would have encompassed people with different approaches to punishing
children. 200 Because the lead prosecutor felt that the jurors summoned to
court would characterize excessive physical discipline as abusive, he felt that
he could approach plea agreement discussions with confidence. 201
Conceptions of a just plea agreement were thus informed by the trial team’s

193
RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 5–6 (2006); see also Interviews with DB
& CJ, AUSAs (2017) (describing in general terms how the character of a cooperator could influence
charging decisions and mentioning a judge’s tendency to push for plea deals in child pornography cases
due to the perceived responses of jurors).
194
See, e.g., Interview with CX, AUSA (2013).
195
See, e.g., Interview with AZ, AUSA (2013).
196
See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2013).
197
See, e.g., Interview with DN, AUSA (2017).
198
See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2017).
199
See HERBERT S. MILLER, WILLIAM F. MCDONALD & JAMES A. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING IN
THE UNITED STATES, at xviii (1978) (“Assistant prosecutors may differ in their conclusions about the
strength of the case and the seriousness of the offender.”).
200
See, e.g., Interview with AY, AUSA ( 2017).
201
Id.
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consensus that they could prove the case before particular jurors they
imagined, too.
IV. ANALYSIS
Having established that federal prosecutors routinely invoke
hypothetical jurors in their work, this Article now considers why this might
be the case in light of the infrequency of trials. First, hypothetical jurors
influence how prosecutors carry out their work in terms of trial preparation,
collaboration, and navigating the norms of professional responsibility.
Second, hypothetical jurors help inform understandings of justice.
A. Effects of Prosecutors’ Consideration of Hypothetical Jurors
Although the chances of particular cases proceeding to trial were low,
federal prosecutors continued to use hypothetical jurors in their work. This
research suggests that this imaginative exercise played three roles:
prosecutors’ invocations of hypothetical jurors (1) had instrumental value in
the event a case proceeded to trial, (2) contributed to prosecutors’
collaborative work, and (3) functioned as an ethical resource.
1.

Hypothetical Jurors Have Instrumental Value if Cases Proceed
to Trial
A first and obvious explanation for jurors’ salience in case preparation
is lawyers’ instrumental interest in anticipating how jurors might respond to
evidence and witnesses if there is any chance that a case would proceed to
trial. To this end, a prosecutor explained that, despite having learned at a trial
advocacy center that only four percent of cases went to trial, she wanted to
be prepared. 202 Anticipating the possibility that a case would be tried in court
was thus analogized by some to preparing for an emergency. 203 Prosecutors
sought to make sure that from the moment a defendant was indicted, a case
could weather the contingencies attendant to trial. This is because change
during trial preparation was continual. A prosecutor explained in this vein
that at a moment’s notice a case involving a cooperating witness could be
202
See, e.g., Interview with AO, AUSA (2013). Echoing this sentiment, numerous colleagues
underscored the importance of assessing cases from hypothetical jurors’ perspectives from the earliest
stages of an investigation. They described the practice, for example, of maintaining notebooks dedicated
to jury-specific considerations in civil cases despite knowledge that ninety-nine percent of cases would
be resolved without trials. In criminal cases, they emphasized the importance of considering jurors before
cases were indicted and explained that examining cases with jurors in mind could serve as a check on a
case that might have been oversold to an AUSA by another law enforcement agent, for example. See,
e.g., Interviews with AE, AP, AS, BF, BL & BY, AUSAs (2013).
203
See, e.g., Interviews with AE, AP & AS, AUSAs (2013). Due to the fact that it was not clear which
cases in the office would resolve through pleas, prosecutors found themselves considering the possibility
of proceeding to trial earlier on in investigations.
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turned on its head if that witness was unexpectedly arrested on the eve of
trial. 204
In the process of defending the United States in a civil suit, another
AUSA made a point of referring to a record of communications between an
air traffic controller and pilot as a “partial transcript” rather than a transcript.
If the case went to trial, he reasoned, this distinction would emphasize the
incompleteness of the interactions that jurors would learn about in court. The
plaintiff, in contrast, referred to an edited version of the transcript that made
it appear as though the airplane at issue was the sole focus of the employee’s
attention rather than one of eight planes for which he was responsible. 205
Numerous AUSAs in both the office’s civil and criminal divisions
agreed that among the reasons to think about juries early in a case was the
possibility that the weakest target of an investigation would exercise his or
her right to a jury trial.206 In this vein, one prosecutor recalled losing a case
because a “small fish” in a group of many targets chose not to plead guilty. 207
In other instances, prosecutors were assigned to cases long after defendants
were indicted and cooperators chosen (and interviewed) by colleagues at
other federal agencies. In one such case, a prosecutor regretted that
instrumental calculations about how to present evidence to jurors often
intervened late in his preparation. He explained his need to pitch the case to
a jury to avoid the impression that the government was “ganging up” on a
little guy. 208
Empirical studies of legal actors’ attitudes toward jurors have tended to
focus on the strategic dimensions of lawyers’ thought processes. 209 In the
context of prosecutorial strategy, this orientation is not an altogether
surprising one because the conflation of chronology and causality can be
built into criminal law itself. 210 Rather than focus only on legal outcomes,
however, anthropologists of law are increasingly attentive to aspects of legal
practice that transcend instrumental considerations. 211 In the context

See, e.g., Interview with BL, AUSA (2013).
See, e.g., Interview with BY, AUSA (2013).
206
See, e.g., Interview with BS, AUSA (2013).
207
See, e.g., Interview with AS, AUSA (2013).
208
See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2017).
209
See Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak About
Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 298–302 (2005) (discussing a case study of a Midwest county that
invited litigators to share general reflections about their approaches to voir dire).
210
See, e.g., RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, INCITEMENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL
SPEECH CRIMES 126–32 (2017) (describing this analytic tendency in the context of prosecuting speech
crimes in international criminal courts).
211
See generally 1 THE NEW LEGAL REALISM: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S
LEGAL PRACTICE (Elizabeth Mertz, Stewart Macaulay & Thomas W. Mitchell eds., 2016).
204
205
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examined here, it is clear that prosecutors’ inordinate attention to jurors is
not entirely attributable to ends-focused concerns such as (in the criminal
context, for instance) obtaining convictions. As we have seen, prosecutors
integrated talk of jurors into routine discussions—with one another and with
me—as they assessed and debated particular decisions.
2.

Hypothetical Jurors Enhance the Democratic Character of
Prosecutorial Decision-Making
Hypothetical jurors also critically intervened in the U.S. Attorney’s
Office to facilitate more egalitarian and collaborative discussions with trial
partners, supervisors, and colleagues from other federal law enforcement
agencies. Rather than explicitly critique colleagues’ opinions, lawyers
frequently invoked the contrary perspectives of hypothetical jurors. Divisive
suggestions, in other words, were imputed to future lay decision-makers.
Invocations of imagined juror reactions thus served as legal fictions that
afforded prosecutors flexibility to reframe peers’ approaches to cases in light
of their various potential interpretations by outsiders. 212
Prosecutors’ ability to invoke jurors during preparation meetings, of
course, depended on the occurrence of such meetings in the first place. The
office’s particular organizational structure thus influenced the potential and
quality of interactions between line attorneys and their supervisors. This
included the office’s division into units with multiple levels of oversight—
including unit heads, chiefs and deputy chiefs, lawyers who worked directly
with the U.S. Attorney and, in some cases, attorneys in the appeals unit who
were assigned to work with trial teams. In the office that was the focus of
this study, prosecutors often raised concerns about future jurors’ views
during preliminary meetings and conversations with law enforcement agents.
These discussions, as described herein, focused on the intelligibility of
evidence and perceived credibility and character of witnesses, defendants,
and victims.
In these contexts, AUSAs grounded the contrary opinions they shared
with supervisors and peers in the imagined perspectives of lay onlookers.
This technique allowed conflicting views to be presented in impersonal terms
while keeping lay intuitions about justice at the center of case discussions.
The diversely constituted and unpredictable interpretations of future jurors
thus raised the stakes of disregarding colleagues’ divergent views even when

212
See ELINOR OCHS & LISA CAPPS, LIVING NARRATIVE: CREATING LIVES IN EVERYDAY
STORYTELLING 163 (2001); Frank Gaik, Radio Talk-Show Therapy and the Pragmatics of Possible
Words, in RETHINKING CONTEXT: LANGUAGE AS AN INTERACTIVE PHENOMENON 271, 285, 287
(Alessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin eds., 1992).
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they were not shared. 213 In an office setting subject to continual personnel
rearrangement facilitated by the presidential appointment of new U.S.
Attorneys, such a technique of neutralizing hierarchical distinctions was
essential.
Though they offered a resource for prosecutors in conversation,
concerns about hypothetical jurors’ perspectives did not necessarily win the
day. In some cases, prosecutors’ assessments of the jury appeal of their cases
failed to persuade supervisors to change their minds. One prosecutor, for
example, recalled being approached by an agent with a fraudulent billing
case involving a physician and her son. The prosecutor’s inclination at the
time was to look for evidence of a larger scheme. When the agent brought
her the case, she recalled, her instinct was to collect evidence that larger
amounts of money had moved in and out of the clinic. If the doctor chose not
to plead guilty, she would face the scrutiny of a similarly skeptical federal
jury. 214 After the defendant was sentenced to probation, the judge criticized
the case, noting that neither defendant had a criminal record. The AUSA felt
vindicated that the judge’s instincts about the case mirrored those she had
imputed to potential jurors— despite a supervisor’s previous dismissal of her
concerns. In subsequent cases, the prosecutor said this experience taught her
to insist that supervisors take her commonsense critiques of cases more
seriously. 215
3. Hypothetical Jurors Are an Ethical Resource for Prosecutors
In Berger v. United States, Justice George Sutherland famously
described the prosecutor’s role as seeing that “justice shall be done.”216 Legal
scholars and practitioners have since puzzled over the meaning of justice in
this context, noting its ambiguity. 217 In practice, however, prosecutors
213
See, e.g., Interview with DA, AUSA (2013) (noting that jurors inject an “inherent degree of
unpredictability” into case outcomes and that no prosecution is so “rock solid” that prosecutors can rule
out the possibility that a jury will acquit a defendant).
214
See, e.g., Interview with AO, AUSA (2013).
215
Id.
216
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done.”); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the
bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”).
217
See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
622 (1999) (considering alternate potential interpretations of prosecutors’ ambiguous directive to seek
justice: “It might be taken to imply a posture of detachment characteristic of that assumed by judges, and
quite apart from that ordinarily assumed by advocates, particularly in the trial context. It might imply an
obligation of fairness in a procedural sense. Or, it might imply a substantive obligation of fairness—for
example, an affirmative duty to ensure that innocent people are not convicted.” (internal citations
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continually formulated understandings of what justice entailed in particular
cases. And they did so with reference to hypothetical jurors’ perspectives,
which served as a proxy for commonsense views that might not otherwise
find explicit expression in their work.
Imagined jurors were conducive to this exercise for several reasons.
First, multiple and shifting identities and opinions could be imputed to them.
That is, the varied and unpredictable responses of the laypeople prosecutors
imagined authorized them to bring diversely constituted lay expertise into
their case preparation. 218 Second, hypothetical jurors’ embodiment of
distinct personas and perspectives, and their broad evaluative potential, gave
them moral malleability for attorneys who invoked them. Depending on the
particular perspective a prosecutor sought to advance, distinct juror
characteristics and intuitions could be selectively emphasized.
Hypothetical jurors thus offered prosecutors a resource with which to
consider disparate meanings of justice in the context of different cases.
Though the prosecutors who were the subjects of this study viewed their
central professional obligation as seeking justice, lawyers articulated
subjective intuitions about the fairness of their cases that varied from one
case and colleague to the next. To this end, invocations of hypothetical
jurors’ perspectives, and formulations of jury appeal in particular, often
brought the subject of justice into case assessments explicitly. One
prosecutor noted, for example, that inquiries into jury appeal were aimed at
determining whether cases were “fundamentally fair.” 219 In this prosecutor’s
view, fairness took shape with reference to hypothetical jurors who he
imagined would differentiate between behavior that warranted prosecution
and that which did not. 220
omitted)); Luban, supra note 88, at 17 (noting the “minimalist” approach taken by formal ethical rules
with respect to prosecutors’ professional obligation to “seek justice not victory”); Fred C. Zacharias,
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV.
45, 48 (1991) (“The do justice standard, however, establishes no identifiable norm. Its vagueness leaves
prosecutors with only their individual sense of morality to determine just conduct.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Cyrus Vance, The Conscience and Culture of a Prosecutor, N.Y.C. B.
ASS’N (June 20, 2012), https://www.manhattanda.org/the-conscience-and-culture-of-a-prosecutor-newyork-city-bar-association [https://perma.cc/D8CW-9CC9] (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is
delimited by “values of conscience and culture” rather than by laws or ethics rules).
218
A fitting description of the creative process in this context can be found in C. Wright Mills’s
description of creativity as a form of “playful[]” thinking, open to “re-arranging,” “re-sort[ing]” and
access to a “variety of viewpoints,” which helped lawyers estrange themselves from their work to see the
details of their cases anew. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 211–14 (2d. ed. 2000)
(noting that creativity has an “unexpected” quality about it, prompted by its combination of multiple ideas
and opinions). Prosecutors’ invocations of hypothetical jurors similarly aid them in estranging themselves
from cases they know intimately to examine their work anew.
219
See, e.g., Interview with DA, AUSA (2013).
220
See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2013).
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Another prosecutor drew a connection between the uncertainty and
unpredictability of his colleagues’ and jurors’ decision-making processes.
Despite the fact that AUSAs shared professional training as lawyers and
carried out similar work, he pointed out, it was entirely possible to get twelve
different opinions on how to approach case preparation or characterize
evidence in opening statements. 221 Another colleague explained that
everyone saw cases differently—often wrangling internally with doubt about
what jurors would make of their judgment calls in particular cases.222
Anticipating jurors’ reactions to evidence and witnesses, however, was an
inherently speculative endeavor. The variability of jurors’ interpretations
thus prompted prosecutors to take a reflexive and flexible approach to
evaluating or cutting particular pieces of evidence from their cases. 223
An analog to prosecutors’ conceptual work can be found in studies of
category creation in other social settings. Though his substantive and
geographic foci differ, Professor Ira Bashkow’s research on the Orokaiva in
Papua New Guinea revealed a similar technique of invoking hypothetical
constructs of strangers to render judgment. For the Orokaiva, conceptions of
foreigners were tied to ideas about abstracted qualities, activities, and objects
understood as “detachable from persons.” 224 Likewise, prosecutors
conceived of justice with reference to characteristics they imputed to the
places of affiliation, institutions, and occupations of imagined citizens.
Though jurors—like foreigners for the Orokaiva—rarely appeared in person,
they remained an abundant and generative foil for their creators, contributing
to formulations of the identities of those who invoked them. 225
Two cases illustrated hypothetical jurors’ relevance as prosecutors
negotiated their professional roles and competing visions of justice. The first
involved the prosecution of a federally employed supervisor who allegedly
violated the Whistleblower Protection Act by disabling a hotline which
contained an anonymous report that criticized him. Noting jurors’ potential
concerns, one prosecutor chose to frame the supervisor’s behavior as not
only violating his obligations as an employee but also violating the freedom
of those seeking to utilize a protected reporting process. Interjecting with the
221

Id.
See, e.g., Interview with BG, AUSA (2014).
223
Id. In this context, prosecutors commented on the importance of strategic thinking about evidence
that should not be presented at trial.
224
IRA BASHKOW, THE MEANING OF WHITEMEN: RACE AND MODERNITY IN THE OROKAIVA
CULTURAL WORLD 146, 249 (2006).
225
See id. at 20 (“[E]ven as whites’ physical presence among Orokaiva has decreased, the importance
of whitemen and taupa kastom in the local culture has continued undiminished, as an elaborate complex
of ideas about whitemen and their customs, institutions, and things has developed in the vernacular
culture.”).
222
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contrary perspective of a detached observer, a colleague noted that the word
“freedom” might sound out of place and urged the use of different language.
Given popular attention to the perils of anonymous bullying, a juror might
find the notion of “freely” reporting abuse less compelling than an argument
for the protection of public welfare compromised by a supervisor’s alleged
actions. 226
In a different case, a prosecutor critiqued a defendant for taking bribes
in dive bars and coffee shops, where much of the surveillance evidence
against him had been gathered. Here, again, a skeptical colleague intervened,
highlighting the subliminally adverse impact that criticizing the defendant’s
location could have on jurors. If white-collar criminals routinely planned
criminal activity on golf courses without complaint, he argued, how would
it look to criticize a defendant’s use of more modest and widely accessible
locales? This colleague’s decision to frame his intervention in this meeting
from a collective vantage point reflected an effort to present his views as
encompassing those of listeners beyond his colleagues. In both cases,
characterizations of cases were revised with an eye toward incorporating the
concerns and intuitions of a plurality of imagined others. Though jurors were
not privy to the interactions that purported to consider their perspectives,
they nonetheless had an outsized influence on prosecutors’ work. 227
As these examples demonstrate, reference to hypothetical jurors
enhanced the procedural justice of prosecutors’ collaborative work—
ensuring that each argument and counterargument was aired and considered
on equal terms. This is not, of course, to suggest, that jurors functioned as an
ethical constraint or that they necessarily facilitated just outcomes. To be
sure, the idiosyncrasies of lawyers’ views, even projected onto jurors, could
vary as widely as those of empaneled deliberating jurors. The next Section
examines some of the justice considerations and concerns that accompany
jurors’ inconsistent and uneven interventions as a narrative and strategic tool
for legal practitioners.
B. Hypothetical Jurors and Justice Considerations
To the extent that common sense and local expertise are invoked to
justify lay decision-makers’ participation in the U.S. legal system, 228 the

See, e.g., Interview with AA, AUSA (2013).
Cf. DAVIS, supra note 74, at 5; SOUTHWORTH & FISK, supra note 87, at 336 (noting prosecutors’
relative lack of accountability due to their “amorphous” clients); McCoy, supra note 53, at 688.
228
For recent examples of this type of invocation, see Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion
and Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861, 874–75 (2017).
226
227
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influence of jurors exceeds their physical presence in courtrooms. 229
Acknowledgment of this empirical reality affirms the practical value of a
robust jury system to lawyers’ work. Though hypothetical jurors are in no
way equivalent to actual individuals summoned to court to participate in
trials, their presence has a democratizing effect on prosecutors’ intraoffice
decision-making processes. This is because they facilitate genuine
engagement with alternative formulations of justice. When prosecutors
imagine and give voice to so-called lay perspectives, they bring “ordinary
moral and commonsense reasoning” into the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. 230 Though prosecutors seldom have the opportunity to elicit
feedback from jurors in person, 231 they can nonetheless draw on the effects
of such interactions as an ethical resource—including, as Professor Robert
Burns has characterized it—by considering the “human dimension of legal
questions that can be lost in piles of briefs and records.” 232
Prosecutors’ views, however, cannot—and ought not—be substituted
for those of jurors. And there are certainly openings for prosecutors to
effectively amend democratically passed laws by declining to prosecute their
violation. Acknowledging this pernicious possibility, however, some
prosecutors were quick to point out that even the presence of jurors during
voir dire supplied them with limited or imperfect information, at best.233 In
spite of their rarity, jurors nonetheless enlarged the range of arguments and
considerations available during prosecutors’ deliberation, prompting them to
revisit or challenge arguments and evidence that might otherwise go
unquestioned.
In the civil context, legal scholars have noted the extent to which
knowledge of jury awards in past trials inform attorneys’ assessments of
likely damage awards during settlement negotiations. 234 John Guinther
argues, for example, that
juries have a function even when they aren’t functioning. That is, decisions are
regularly made about the course a case will take based on the participants’
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979) (inviting further empirical attention to how formal legal
proceedings influence lawyers’ strategy and behavior).
230
BURNS, supra note 6, at 126.
231
Cf. Participation in a meeting with CZ during which a prosecutor said he learned jurors’ first-hand
impressions from a post-trial meeting that was permitted in another jurisdiction where he worked as an
Assistant District Attorney. See Interview with CZ, AUSA (2013).
232
BURNS, supra note 6, at 121.
233
See Offit, supra note 100, at 19; Offit, supra note 131, at 172 (noting that federal jury selection
was a “‘low information’ process” due to judges’ wide discretion to limit the quantity and substance of
the questions they posed to prospective jurors).
234
See, e.g., JONAKAIT, supra note 193, at 11.
229
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beliefs of what would likely happen if the case were tried by a jury. It is probably
no exaggeration to say that, directly or indirectly, the large majority of civil
cases are settled without trial for this reason. Similarly, in criminal cases,
defense lawyers particularly agonize over whether theirs is a “good” or “poor”
jury case. 235

This effect may nonetheless be tempered by litigants who increasingly
rely on past settlements as “precedent” for settlement decisions.236 Others
point out that opportunities to informally and advantageously settle disputes
may be limited by the absence of access to public adjudication. 237
As the examples discussed in this Article suggest, however,
hypothetical jurors’ influence on case outcomes requires further empirical
study. In assessing whether justice interests are served by the consideration
of lay perspectives, several factors deserve emphasis. First, it is possible that
the selective invocation of hypothetical jurors among different prosecutors
and units resulted in unlike approaches to like cases. Exacerbating the
potential for the inconsistent enforcement of federal law, prosecutors with
less experience with jury trials could find lay decision-makers less relevant
to their case preparation. In the declined case involving fake drug
prescriptions, for example, a prosecutor in a different U.S. Attorney’s office
might have chosen to prosecute the case due to the clear violation of federal
law, availability of evidence, and preparedness of other law enforcement
agents to move forward with the case. Likewise, lawyers could differ in their
prosecutions of drug cases that involved “reverse” sting operations from one
jurisdiction, narcotics unit, and part of the country to the next.
Cases referred to as “home invasion reversals” presented a different
ethical dilemma. To what extent could the selective prosecution of
defendants who seemed superficially more threatening (or less sympathetic)
lead to the disproportionate prosecution of those with criminal records? Or
to the targeting of those already known to the law enforcement agents who
investigated them? Legal scholars and practitioners in the United States have
long advanced arguments about the potential for jury verdicts to be
“unpredictable and arbitrary, susceptible to being moved by factors which

JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA, at xv (1988).
J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1727 (2012)
(“Contrary to the conventional account of settlements, characterized as unknown and unknowable,
empirical evidence reveals that prior settlement outcomes, which internalize the various distortions
mentioned above, now serve as an increasingly important determinant of future settlements. As the
shadow of the law is fading, a new shadow is emerging: the shadow of settlement.”).
237
See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 46 (1984) (“[I]nformal community justice is
unlikely to serve many disputants unless it is intimately connected to some formal legal agency.”).
235
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do not have to do with the evidence.” 238 Debates about jurors’ right to be
informed about their power to disregard—or “nullify”—the law point to a
similar source of ambivalence about discretionary judgment with limited
oversight. 239 Greater awareness of how consideration of jury appeal can
effectively amend the enforcement of federal laws thus also demands further
study. On one hand, such considerations have the potential to counter the
overcriminalization of cases that fail to comport with commonsense ideas
about justice. On the other, prosecutors can freely authorize their own
idiosyncratic views by putting them in the mouths of hypothetical others.
Because cases are ultimately settled by groups rather than individuals,
collective deliberation (whether in a jury room or prosecutor’s office)
emerges as a vital context for sharing, challenging, or reconciling discordant
opinions.
Alternative ethical frameworks for bringing extralegal considerations
to criminal prosecutions warrant empirical attention, too. This includes the
implications of preparing cases in the shadow of idiosyncratic federal judges
or presidentially appointed U.S. Attorneys whose views may be well-known
to AUSAs and yet be perceived as unjust in the context of particular cases.
As a rhetorical device through which commonsense justice claims can be
aired and contested, reference to hypothetical jurors may also stand as an
alternative to other metrics for exercising discretion—including AUSAs’
perceptions, for example, of a defendant’s risk aversion or poor quality of
legal representation.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO FACILITATE THE CONSIDERATION OF JURORS
The reduced presence of juries has not entirely robbed them of their
ideational effects, including their role as an ethical resource for prosecutors
during case preparation. This is because prosecutors often impute lay
conceptions of fairness and local knowledge to lay decision-makers in the
course of routine case preparation. In some cases, this knowledge originated
from encounters with jurors during voir dire, questionnaire responses, or
colleagues’ impressions of jurors that were empaneled in past trials. In other
cases, prosecutors attributed their own local knowledge to “proxy” jurors
that included nonlawyer friends, family, and office staff. Though jurors did
not participate in such discussions firsthand, this Article challenges the
notion that prosecutors’ work is completely attenuated from consideration of

See, e.g., PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 218 (1984).
JOHN W. CLARK III, THE AMERICAN JURY: ISSUES AND COMMENTARY 157–58 (2010); NEIL
VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 236–40 (2007).
238
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outside, lay observers. 240 Time and again this public takes the form of an
imagined jury.
Despite the inherent difficulty of applying findings from one case study
to distinct office settings, this research highlights the potential of particular
office practices to facilitate consideration of hypothetical jurors’ views. First,
convening regular meetings with trial teams, supervisors, colleagues, and
staff can simulate the range of responses jurors can bring to a case. In the
context of this study, such meetings took the form of status updates with law
enforcement agents who were assembling evidence and, later, focused on
mooting trial teams’ opening statements and summations.
Second, to the extent that prosecutions do result in jury trials, U.S.
Attorney’s Office leadership should regularly circulate trial calendars and
encourage AUSAs to observe portions of colleagues’ trials as a precondition
for trying their own cases. At the conclusion of trials, attorneys who served
on or assisted trial teams should be encouraged to discuss their experience in
the form of internal Continuing Legal Education programming that assumes
a conversational format. Prosecutors should also be encouraged to devote
time early in their case preparation to drafting—or locating— plain-language
jury instructions, case-specific voir dire questions, questionnaires, and case
statements. These practices further reinforce the practice of putting potential
jurors’ perspectives front and center in AUSAs’ routine work.
Prosecutors’ integration of lay perspectives into case discussions also
has the distinct and underappreciated benefit of making their own decisionmaking practices more democratic. As this research reveals, the potential
presence of jurors underscored the importance of considering multiple
perspectives by eliciting colleagues’ divergent opinions. Furthermore,
jurors’ views were invoked as part of a constructive and nonconfrontational
technique of shaping colleagues’ behavior. Jurors thus contributed an ethical
dimension to prosecutors’ talk by offering a vantage point that was distinct
from the lawyers and supervisors involved in particular cases which allowed
for external standards of judgment and critique. As part of this practice, trial
teams verbalized impressions of evidence and witnesses with reference to
jurors’ third-person perspectives.
Beyond the contributions of hypothetical jurors discussed in this
Article, social scientists have highlighted a number of the jury system’s
virtues. These include evidence that jury service in criminal cases facilitates
broader civic engagement, including a willingness to participate as voters in
240
See SOUTHWORTH & FISK, supra note 87, at 336 (“The absence of a traditional client enables
prosecutors to take a broad view of what justice requires in a particular case, but it also means that no one
outside the bureaucracy of the federal or state Department of Justice or law enforcement community
effectively constrains how prosecutors exercise their power.”).
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electoral politics. 241 Another study found, with some qualification, that
citizens who deliberate as part of twelve-person, unanimous civil trials are
more likely to vote after their service.242 Focusing on civil trials in particular,
empirical studies have drawn attention to the favorable impressions of the
fairness of the legal system generated by jury participation.243 Others argue
that the jury has a legitimating function as a democratic institution that
allows ordinary people to render legal judgment, 244 contribute to a factfinding body, 245 and reap the benefits of an educational resource. 246
Prosecutors nonetheless face barriers to empaneling a diverse group of
prospective jurors. Though research suggests that most attrition from jury
service occurs during the preliminary “summoning” and “summons
response” phases, 247 the greatest source of juror attrition observed in this
study related to the hardship a trial might pose to a prospective juror. This
finding is corroborated by jury participation research carried out in
241
See JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 32 (2010) (describing the authors’ approach to
testing whether jury participation led to greater civil engagement in a Thurston County, Washington case
study); John Gastil et al., Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the Participation Hypothesis,
70 J POL. 351, 359 (2008) (noting evidence of a “pervasive and enduring effect of criminal jury
deliberation on electoral engagement”).
242
Traci Feller, John Gastil & Valerie Hans, The Civic Impact of Civil Jury Service, VOIR DIRE,
Summer 2016, at 24, 26 (noting that this result was particularly true of non-automotive tort cases that
involve “at least one organization, as opposed to exclusively private individuals”); see also Valerie P.
Hans, John Gastil & Traci Feller, Deliberative Democracy and the American Civil Jury, 11 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 697, 712–15 (2014) (providing an additional discussion of how findings are extended to
the civil context).
243
Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve
as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282, 285 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
244
VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 248 (1986) (citing ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE & JOHN CANFIELD SPENCER, AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE (1854));
see also ALBERT W. DZUR, DEMOCRATIC PROFESSIONALISM: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, IDENTITY, AND PRACTICE 111 (2008) (“Far from merely
constraining the power of the judge, the jury system legitimates the power of the judge.”). For a discussion
of the seventeenth-century origin of this principle, see SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 31 (1990)
(“The argument that the common individual is capable of knowing and understanding the law, and having
understood is the best judge of its application to individual cases, is an inherently democratic claim of
epistemology.”).
245
See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386,
387–90 (1954).
246
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 334–37 (Schoken ed., 1st ed. 1961) (1835)).
247
As Professor Mary Rose and her co-authors outline in their study of lifetime jury participation in
Texas, jurors must be summoned for jury service, recognize and respond to this summons, and complete
a period of in-court questioning in order to be assigned to sit as jurors in particular cases. See Mary R.
Rose et al., Selected to Serve: An Analysis of Lifetime Jury Participation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
33, 35 (2012).
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California, noting that citizens’ likelihood of being summoned and
responding to summonses is strongly influenced by their income and
education. 248 These findings have led researchers and those involved in jury
reform initiatives to address practical and material obstacles to jury
participation, including compensation that can alleviate financial hardship
imposed by jury service 249 and the expansion of jury source lists, which often
rely on voter registration and licensed driver records. 250 A significant
contribution of these studies is the part they play in unsettling the
misconception that citizens routinely ignore summonses due to their
indifference or hostility toward jury service.251 In fact it has long been known
that the individuals who are least likely to participate as jurors are those who
face economic barriers including the need to care for a child or other
dependent, or the risk of loss of income. 252 Though it is beyond the scope of
this Article to propose jury reforms addressing this systemic problem,
ongoing empirical research is shedding light on obstacles that prevent
prosecutors from encountering juries as diversely and unpredictably
constituted as those they imagine.

248
See id. at 45–52; see also HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 64–65 (1993) (noting that factors that are likely to
lead to prospective jurors’ excusal include “(1) economic hardship; (2) lack of child care; (3) age; (4) the
distance traveled and transportation; and (5) illness”).
249
See GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, THE STATE-OF-THESTATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 13 (2007) (“[S]tates have
begun to recognize the relationship between the amount of juror fees, the proportion of citizens who are
excused for financial hardship, and minority representation in the jury pool. As a result, a number of states
have increased juror fees . . . .”); Paula Hannaford-Agor, The Laborer is Worthy of His Hire and Jurors
Are Worthy of Their Juror Fees, 21 COURT MANAGER 38, 38 (2006) (noting that states are substantially
increasing juror fees in order to alleviate the financial hardship of jury service, making it possible for
many citizens to serve, and to better reflect in monetary terms the value of jury service to the justice
system).
250
G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, JURY SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 4 (1996).
251
See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at 248 (“Among those who do appear and are sent into a
courtroom for voir dire, the art of getting excused is highly developed. Individuals accuse themselves of
prejudice, students say they cannot afford to miss classes, and self-employed persons state they cannot
afford to miss work.”); ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, IMPROVING CITIZEN RESPONSE TO JURY SUMMONSES:
A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 117–20 (1998) (presenting a multi-sited study including surveys of
administrators in 100 state and federal courts and 400 summoned jurors); GUINTHER, supra note 235, at
288–89, 353–54 (noting, based on a survey of 352 individuals who served as state and federal jurors in
civil cases in the Philadelphia area, that a majority understood their cases, formed opinions based on the
evidence in their respective trials, and left with a positive impression of the jury system).
252
See BOATRIGHT, supra note 251, at 73; see also JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, THE RELATIONSHIP OF JUROR FEES AND TERMS OF SERVICE TO JURY SYSTEM
PERFORMANCE 40 (1991), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/juries/id/105
[https://perma.cc/WY9P-FM9P].
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CONCLUSION
In writing on the Sixth Amendment, legal scholars have emphasized the
jury’s role in helping lawyers “fulfill their duties responsibly.” 253 This
widely acknowledged ethical intervention becomes concrete when one looks
at how lawyers invoke jurors in practice. Though absent from empirical
research to date, federal prosecutors’ references to abstracted jurors play a
vital role in their everyday work. This research demonstrates that
prosecutors’ conceptions of jurors’ judgment affects their own. 254 This is
because the specter of jurors’ participation in criminal cases brought
commonsense ideas about justice to prosecutors’ discussions—making jury
concerns salient from the moment a case landed on an AUSA’s desk. 255
Such attentiveness to jurors’ potential perceptions is brought into relief
first by prosecutors’ invocations of “jury appeal” as a basis for articulating
concerns about their cases. Second, as investigations are underway,
hypothetical jurors can offer a detached point of reference during routine
interactions with colleagues, witnesses, victims, and defendants. Because
any criminal case can lead to a trial, many prosecutors recognize the strategic
value of considering jurors’ perspectives early and often. And when
assessments of evidence are at odds with those of supervisors, hypothetical
jurors facilitate critiques in impersonal and constructive terms. Beyond
instrumental considerations related to efficaciously presenting evidence in a
case, hypothetical jurors are also a point of departure for prosecutors’
formulations of justice. This often takes the form of prosecutors imputing
ideas about fair prosecutions to lay decision-makers whom they imagine they
might encounter.
Legal scholars who draw attention to the declining number of trials in
the United States often assert the value of lay participation in symbolic terms.
If the trend away from juries can be reversed, some argue, a reinvigorated
jury can bring greater legitimacy and accountability to the legal system by
serving as an external check on professional lawyers. 256 Ethnographic
research in prosecutors’ offices is uniquely positioned to sharpen the stakes
of this claim. The jury system ought to be valued for its far-reaching practical
and ethical effects on legal practice, even as it is presently constituted. That
Sixth Amendment at Trial, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 671, 671–72 (2012).
Andrew E. Taslitz, The People’s Peremptory Challenge and Batson: Aiding the People’s Voice
and Vision Through the “Representative” Jury, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1675, 1678 (2012) (“The jury acts as
the People’s eyes by monitoring the state and its agents. That monitoring reveals abuses of power,
discourages those abuses, and humbles our leaders and their agents.”).
255
See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2013).
256
See, e.g., ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION 139–42 (2013) (discussing the jury’s role in acting as a force for accountability
which serves as the community’s consciousness and as an ultimate check on government power).
253
254

1118

113:1071 (2019)

Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury

is, we should care about jurors because they concretely and powerfully
matter to the lawyers tasked with enforcing the law fairly. Though the
obsolescence of the jury trial is difficult to imagine, keeping jurors
imaginable should be enough of an impetus to heed scholars’ warnings.
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